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CHAJPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Economic literature abounds "with statements of rules and principles 
that are required for the efficient operation of the public economy (lt6a, 
ii6b). No set of rules is, however, uniformly applicable, a fact clearly 
reflected in a statement by Musgrave: 
"There is no simple set of principles, no uniform rule of normative 
behavior that may be applied to the conduct of public economy. Rather, we 
are confronted with a number of seperate, though interrelated, functions 
that require distinct solutions." (Ii6, p. 5) 
I lusgrave groups the major objectives of budget policy under three 
main headings: 
(1) those that secure adjustments in the allocation of resources, 
(2) those that secure adjustments in the distribution of income and 
wealth, and 
(3) those that secure economic stabilization. 
This study is, however, not concerned with an evaluation of how well a 
specific tax system accomplishes its objectives, but mil, rather, 
concentrate on one aspect of the public economy—namely, the evaluation of 
the responsiveness of existing state-local tax structures. 
The responsiveness of state-local tax structures is a very important 
aspect because in recent years state and local governments had to cope 
with the inability of their tax systems to s^apply automatically the 
necessary financial resources. This failure of the state revenue structures 
to respond more than proportionally, or at least proportionally, to state 
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economic growth has forced state legislatiores continually to change tax 
rates or enact new tax sources. This is essentially an economic problem 
that evolved into a political problem. 
The low revenue productivity of state and local government as it 
exists today arose out of the development of the revenue structure of the 
federal government during World War ZC, when federal revenue demands were 
high. The federal government pre-empted the income tax base as its major 
revenue source and improved it with a general withholding system. This 
was a very successful venture and the federal income tax turned out to be 
quite responsive. State governments, however, were left with the 
relatively inelastic tax sources su.ch as property taxes and various outlay 
taxes. 
The responsiveness of state-local tax revenues is usually measured in 
terms of income elasticity. A given tax is considered income elastic if, 
>jith an unchanged tax structure, the incremental tax revenue/personal 
income ratio is greater than the average tax revenue/personal income ratio. 
Symbolically, the response of changes in the tax yield T to changes in the 
level of total state income Y can be expressed as 
at/Iq 
*•1 " A T / X ^  
where T and Y are the initial levels of tax yield and income. measures 
the percentage change in the tax yield that results with a given change in 
income. The value of can be disaggregated into changes in the effective 
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tax rate and changes in the tax base "with respect to changes in the total 
1 income. 
These relationships hold for a given tax soijrce. Correspondingly, 
the elasticity of a tax system or a group of taxes "will "be equal to the 
•weighted average of the income elasticity of the conponent taxes (6L), 
the weights being the respective yields. 
Income elasticity and the stability of tax revenue 
The primary criticism against an elastic tax system centers around 
the fact that fluctuating economic conditions could result in unacceptable 
fluctuations in public revenues (66). In the evaluation of the responsive­
ness of a tax system, adequate revenue and the stability of revenue seem 
to be the two major requirements of a tax system. The two objectives are 
basically in conflict. In recent years, adequate revenue has required 
that public revenues rise more rapidly than personal income to meet 
"koie yield elasticity of a given tax source can also be stated as 
where is the base elasticity of the statutory tax rate t with respect to 
^t/to 
changes in the tax base B, or —y.—and where K is the income elas-
ticity of the tax base, or ——y—. In the case of a flat-rate tax, E, = 0, 
and the income elasticity of the tax yield equals the income elasticity of 
the tax base (li6, pp. 505-508). 
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increased expenditure needs. Stability requires that public revenue 
remain relatively stable in response to income movements. Much of the 
emphasis on the stability of state public revenue is a carry-over from 
the pre-Keynesian preoccupation of economists with business cycle activity. 
The absence of severe business cycles since World War U, together -with 
the federal government's firm commitment to a policy of economic stability 
at maximum employment, strongly suggests that the stability criterion can 
be overençjhasized. 
The presence of a "controlled" economy does not preclude the possi­
bility of fluctuating economic conditions, especially at the state level. 
In a state like Iowa which is heavily agricultural, fluctuations in farm 
commodity prices might cause continuous mild fluctuations in state income. 
The. question thus arises of what can be done to ensure long-run income 
elasticity while ensuring short-run stability of public revenue and 
expenditures. 
Counter-cyclical fiscal policy This method, which appears to be 
the most attractive, operates by insulating public expenditures from 
fluctuations in public revenues. By building up budget surpluses in 
prosperous years and running; them down in years with low revenue receipts, 
a reasonable degree of stability in public expenditure is ensured. This 
policy does not eliminate fluctuations in public revenues; rather it 
prevents them from generating similar fluctuations in expenditure. The 
difficulty with this approach is the problem of distinguishing betvreen a 
trend and short-run fluctuations, 
A necessary condition for the successful implementation of the 
counter-cyclical policy is the existence of large surpluses of funds 
accuKTolated in the past and/or a boom in commodity prices at the time when 
the decision is taken to pursue such policies. 
Avcraf^ing income This policy involves an application of the 
technique for stabilizing incomes in primary producing areas. Short-run 
fluctuations in public revenue might be smoothed out by changing the income 
tax base from, the current income to, say, a three-year moving average. 
This would introduce an element of stability -without destroying the long-
run elasticity of the tax system. 
The results derived from such a system would be minor, because of 
.the small proportion of state revenues originating from income taxes. 
Furthermore, it would be costly and difficult to administrate. 
Another problem is that averaging income implies greater fluctuation 
in after-tax income. This has an influence on outlay taxes through its 
effect on consuiqjtion. The net effect, hoicever, should be stabilizing, 
since consumption outlays tend to be more s-table than income over the 
short run. 
Shift toT-xards outlay taxes This proposal is based on the fact 
that consumption is more stable than income over the short run. Therefore, 
reliance on outlay taxes makes for a more stable revenue system. This 
does not necessarily imply decline in income elasticity of a tax system 
in the long run, as the ratio of consxmçtion to income has been constant 
over long periods. Such a tax system can be made more elastic by intro­
ducing a higher taxation rate on commodities with a high income elasticity 
of demand. 
With a given degree of elasticity, the required revenue may be raised 
either through an emphasis on income "baxes or outlay taxes, or by some 
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combination of income and outlay taxes. It can therefore be said that 
short-run stability of public revenues can be secured vrî.thout sacrificing 
long-run elajticity through a variety of methods.. The actual implementa­
tion of these methods, however, presents numerous practical difficulties. 
Any discussion of the income elasticity of a tax structure inevitably 
leads to the question of what the optimum income elasticity of a state tax 
structure should be, and what proportion tax receipts should be of state 
personal income. There is no general answer to these questions. It depends 
on prevailing circumstances, such as the severity of the disincentive 
effects of steeply progressive rates and the efficiency and the productivity 
of public expenditure. No specific quantitative answer is therefore 
possible to this cozr^lex question. 
Objectives of the study 
As discussed briefly in the previous section, one of the major 
problems of state and local authorities is the supply of necessary 
resources to satisfy an increasing demand for public services. This 
study t-jill concentrate only on revenue aspects of the problem. 
The specific objectives of the study are: 
(1) to determine the responsiveness of the Iowa tax system over time, 
(2) to determine the changes in the responsiveness of the lovia tax 
system resulting from the changes in the tax structure enacted in 196?, and 
(3) to project potential revenue from tax sources till 1975. 
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Extent of the analysis 
A detailed study of the Iowa tax sources was made to evaluate their 
responsiveness to economic groivith and, by inç)lication, the ability of the 
tax system ,to satisfy the demand for public services in the future. 
An arbitrary distinction is made between tax revenues and program-
associated revenue such as charges for specific services. These program-
associated revenues might be assumed to relate more to state and local 
programs than to the groifth in the economy. Only tax revenue sources are 
treated here. The following major tax revenue sources are included: 
state personal income tax, state corporate income tax,•sales and use tax, 
motor vehicle fuel tax, insurance premium .tax, inheritance tax, cigarette 
tax, and property taxes. 
Since the Iowa tax structure has been subject to numerous tax base 
and rate changes, the evaluation on the basic responsiveness of the tax 
system should be made in abstraction of the exogenous tax law changes. 
The basic consideration is, therefore, the response of the tax base to 
economic change after allowing for the effects of changes in the tax rate 
structure or base. 
n 
CÎÏÏLPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITEEATURE 
There is at the moment no theory of state revenue generation. In a 
recent article Thomassen (^3) has tried to move in this direction, but one 
is inclined to agree :vith Zvi Griliches in his review article on the 
Broolcings model: 
"Since there is no behavioral theory of either government 
receipts or expenditures the various equations in this chapter are 
devoted to approximating by one or two variables, relationships which 
are the consequence of more complicated underlying ta% tables, laws 
or regulations. A great deal has been invested in this endeavor, but 
it is not clear what has been gained from such a 'motorization' of 
this section of the national accounts .... But why not feed the 
complete tax table into the computer and let it compute what tax 
receipts will be. Compactness is probably the main and onHy advan­
tage of this type of estimation." (13) 
Noti-dthstanding this lack of a bei^vioral theory of government 
revenues, various studies have attempted to measure the responsiveness of 
state and local tax systems. 
The first study into the revenue response of local and state tax 
systems was done by Groves and ICahn (lit). They were mainly concerned 
with the meaning of the adequacy criterion as it applies to state and 
local government finances. By adequacy it was implied that a particular 
tax should produce a given initial amount and respond in such a manner 
as to permit the continuation of a given volume and quality of govenmental 
services. They therefore concluded that state governments could rely on 
a tax system that approximates a constant fraction of total real income 
over a period of time. This in^lies that, in a period of changing prices 
and assuming that money incomes change in proportion to the price level, 
tax yields would have to change in proportion to the change in money 
income. l-Jhen total money income changes are due to a change in real output 
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-.•rith a cons tant price level, tax revenue should essentially renain constant 
and still maintain governnient services. 
In most cases, however, changes in both price level and real income 
are involved. Groves and Kahn therefore argued that, froin. the purpose of 
maintaining a given level of ta:c-financed services, tax yields may be 
allowed to vary in the same direction as total income, but the variation 
should be less than in proportion to the variation in total income, 
Tliis conclusion, however, T^as qualified, in the sense that the 
distinction between changes due to variations in output and those due to 
variations in the price level should not be ignored for the different 
t}pes of taices. In the case of a unit sales tax, the tax yield depends 
entire!!;;^'' on real consumption. Consumption of commodities is mostly 
positively related to real income. If the change in income is due to 
variations in the general price level as well as in real income, then the 
consumption of the taxed goods may also vary in accordance id-th its price 
elasticity of demand. For if we were to assume that the prices of all 
goods (before taxes) can change at the same rate^ it follows that a 
general rise in prices will result in a relative decline in the prices 
(after taxes) of goods subject to a unit tax, A fall in prices would 
have the opposite effect. This raises the question of the difference 
between the nature of sales tax yields under conditions of income change 
caused by price fluctuation and those caused by fluctuation in real income. 
If income increases, the yield of a per unit sales tax may be 
expected to rise in either case. The real value of the yield wiH rise 
if the groi-rth in income is because of rising output. The real value of 
the yield fall if income change has been caused by a change in the 
price (after tazc) of the taxed goods and may lead to some increases in 
the volume of sales, and hence yields. This may hardly be sufficient to 
offset the decline in the real value of the tax dollar. 
The case is, of course, different for ad valorem taxes (a percentage 
of the sales price). The real value of the yield of a specific ad valorem 
tax Tjill not be affected by changes in the price level, provided the 
relative price of the taxed good 'will remain the same as before. The same 
applies to a general sales tacc. Here the value of the tax yield is not 
so much dependent on the price level as on the relation betyzeen consulta­
tion and income. 
Taxes on property are also ad valorem in that both quantity and values 
affect the tax base. The low sensitivity of the yield to changes in 
income may be ascribed to tvo causes. To the extent that quantity of 
property to be assessed consists of real estate, its fluctuations are in 
part due to causes other than changes in total real income, as for 
instance the rate of population grot-rth and the building cycle. 
The second point to consider is the effect on assessed valuation of 
property i-xhen total income changes because of variations in the general 
price level. Here the lag in assessed value behind changes in the market 
value of property introduces another element of stability. This lag is 
partly due to the requirement of state laws that property shall be 
assessed at normal market value. The word normal suggests that the 
assessor should aim. at normal values, which may require discounting of 
upward or dovjnv.'ard trends in the real estate values. Hence, taxation at 
a level proportional to assessed value tJill result in the ratio of tax to 
income falling when incomes are rising, and rising when incomes are falling. 
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In the case of income taxes, the state * s gains (or losses) in real 
value of tax yields rise (fall) mth income, whether because of changes 
in the price level or in output. 
The conclusions therefore are that, if fluctuations in income are 
solely due to changes in real income, an income elasticity as low as 
possible (close to zero) might be required» Conversely, if they are 
exclusively due to price level changes, an elasticity close to unity 
mirent be needed. 
Groves and Kahn (II4) calculated the income elasticity of various state 
and local taxes. The functional form they fitted to the data was: 
Log T = log a + b log Y (2.1) 
where 
T = Total tax from a specific tax source 
Y = State personal income 
a = Regression coefficient 
b = Regression coefficient 
This function v;:as only fitted on those taxes where no rate or 
administrative changes occurred, which limited their analysis somewhat. 
After this pioneering study of the income elasticity of state and 
local tax sti*uctures, numerous similar studies were conducted. The two 
most significant, mostly for their methodological suggestions, were by 
¥ilford (66), and Legler and Shapiro (39). 
tJilford suggests•that the stability of state revenue is an obsolete 
criterion and the en^hasis should be put on state taxes with an income 
elasticity of greater than one in order to meet expenditures. Wilford 
criticizes Groves and Kahn for not treating taxes where rate changes 
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occuri'cd. Rcscorclicrs have abandoned attempts at coirçiuting the elasticity 
coefficients because of discontiniiities in the revenue data associated 
1-d.th rate changes. It is often assumed, implicitly that this relationship 
is proportional, i,e., that 
§ • 1  =  1  ( 2 . 2 )  
The alternative suggested is that statutory rate changes "be included 
in the regression equation in the foUoiidng form: 
Log R = log c + e log X + f log r (2.3) 
where 
R = Tax revenue 
c = Some constant 
Y = Aggregate personal income 
r = Ta:-: rate 
This procedure adjusts reported revenue data for rate changes. The 
coefficient denoted by (f) can then be called the rate elasticity coef­
ficient, Only in the case of perfectly inelastic demand t-rould one ezgect 
a coefficient of 1. If this is not the case the unity assunption can 
alter the income elasticity coefficient (e) substantially. It seems that 
this argument is most applicable to the sales and use tax. 
The second suggested modification concerns the relevant income 
variable to be used as an independent variable. The rationale for 
changing this variable depends, according to Wilford, on the difference 
beti'zecn economic groi-rth and economic development. He equates grox-riih to 
an increase in aggregate income, inrhiie development iinpHes an increase in 
per capita income. Therefore, the income variable to be used depends on 
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the type of change a government is experiencing. According to this agru-
ment, a state lilce Iowa which has experienced mostly an increase in per 
capita income with a relatively stable popiilation, the relevant income 
elasticity estimates should be based on per capita income. 
The rationale for this argument is that when per capita income 
increases over time, the marginal propensity to consume, and therefore 
the composition of consuinption outlays, would alter the response of tax 
liabilities to income change. "When aggregate income increases in propor­
tion to population, the composition of the market basket is less likely 
to change.^ 
Wilford then estimated the income elasticities on the bases of these 
two modifications for each individual state tax source, 
Legler and Shapiro contend that VJilford*s study contains two distinct 
weaknesses. First, it ignores the specific mechanism by which tax revenue 
varies vd.th income, and secondly, it is based on the assumption that the 
yield of one tax is independent of other state taxes. In the studies 
mentioned, it was assumed that elasticity over time is constant, implying 
that the relationship between revenue and income is independent of the 
imposition of new taxes or changes in existing taxes. As an exançile of 
the interdependence between revenue sources, they cited the example where 
sales tax is a deduction under the income tax. Thus, an increase in the 
sales tax would lead to a decline in the income tax base. 
-xf the population stays constant and the increase in income results 
only from an increasing per capita income, it does not matter statistically 
whether total income or per capita income is used. 
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To accommodate the shortcomings in the previous studies, they suggest 
a new methodology based on the folloicJig assumptions: 
(1) there are only two distinct types of taxes—an income tax and a 
sales or consumption type tax 
(2) the supply of taxed and untaxed goods is perfectly elastic^ i.e., 
the non-taxed component of price is unaffected hy the introduction of the 
tax 
(3) state income and growth is independent of the tax yields 
Based on these assunç)tions, they developed the follovmig model; 
R = r^Y + rgC (2.1) 
where 
r^ = Income tax rate 
r^ = Sales tax rate 
C = Expenditure on taxable goods 
Y = Income 
Equation (2.U) is then extended by the hypothesis that 
C = C(y,Y,K,p,r) (2.5) 
where 
y = Per capita income 
I>r - Population 
p - Before sales tax price 
Combining equations (2.It) and (2.5) results in the folloiving: 
Pu = ^ (y^II^p^r^arg) (2.6) 
Equation (2.6) was estimated by a multiple regression equation for various 
states experiencing different types of groirrth. 
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Property, severance, license, death and gift taccès were excluded. 
The taxes included in the multiple regression were sales and gross receipts 
tax, motor veliicle fuel taxes, alcoholic beverage taxes, tobacco taxes, 
the personal income tax, and corporate income tax. 
Fitting thZLS model to Iowa data, they found that the only significant 
variables at the 10 percent level of significance were the personal income 
tax rate, per capita income, and population elasticities. Population was 
the dominant variable. Furthermore, the tax structure was less responsive 
to changes in per capita income than any of the other states sampled. 
The conclusion was that Iowa's tax structure was more responsive to 
population change, while the state actually was experiencing a high rate 
of per capita income growth with a nearly constant population. Given the 
type of growth in the state, it would be better to raise the income tax 
rate. 
The study has commendable objectives, but it has weaknesses. (1) It 
did not determine the degree of interdependence. Nobody would argue that 
interdependency among state taxes does not exist, but one might find that, 
in the event of the introduction of new taxes, the interdependency between 
them might be offsetting. (2) The study did not include all tax sources 
existing at the state level. (3) The proposed model suffers from the 
familiar problem of being too aggregative. 
A different approach to estimating the aggregate responsiveness of 
state tax structures i^as done by Thomassen (52) for the state of Georgia. 
His basic objective was to abstract from the conplex structure of tax rate 
changes, base changes, and administrative changes—mainly because of the 
difficulty of quantifying these changes. Another problem he wanted to 
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avoid was tlie possibility of error in projecting personal income change 
into fut-jrc periods, thereby compo-unding the error in predicting futiire 
tax revenues. 
As an alternative, he suggested that state governments apply a certain 
propensity to tax the "potential of revenue generation" in a specific 
state. If tliis vere the way state governments actually behave, state 
revenues could be projected by some variables characteristic of this so-
called revenue potential. This approach would eliminate the problem of 
forecasting input units. The only problem would be the fluctuation in 
the response function itself. 
Furthermore, Thomassen proposes that, if the degree of exploitation 
of the revenue potential proves stable in a period reflecting major 
changes in the tax structure and administration, such a function might be 
used to predict state revenues. 
Because of his desire to eliminate the forecasting error in the 
independent variables, the choice of explanatory variables was restricted 
to those which led the revenue series by at least one year. By testing 
various combinations of variables and associated lag-patterns, he found 
that state revenue could be explained by the following independent 
variables: 
X = Population lagged by 2 years 
2l—2 
X-3- y = Employment in contract construction in the state as a 
fraction of total non-agricultural employment lagged 
by 7 years 
X, . = Gross private domestic investment in the U. S. as a 
" fraction of national G.N.P. lagged by 1 year 
jilthoiirh tills function resulted in a high the lack of fit for indi­
vidual years vas unacceptable. This fact led him to state that, "Careful 
review of predicted and actual revenue series suggested an improvement by 
means of a step variable, 
X5 : 1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,0, 
With X = 1 in 1950 and X = 0 in 1951." 
In spite of his atteupt to eliminate various rate, base, and adminis­
trative changes, they were reintroduced by the use of the dummy variable 
X^. It seems that the variables introduced to determine the potential of 
revenue generation and their lag patterns might be the result of a trial 
and error process rather than deduced on a prior basis. 
The basic assumption of the model, that state governments apply a 
certain propensity to tax, might be somewhat unrealistic. The revenue 
might be heavily influenced by pressures from the expenditure side. 
This study vn.ll incorporate most of the aspects suggested in the 
review of literature on the responsiveness of state sources. No attempt 
i-d-ll be made to introduce drastic new methodological approaches. The • 
study Tfd.ll concentrate on the empirical estimation of the responsiveness 
of the Iowa "i;ax structure. 
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CHAPTER 3.' STATE MD LOCAL TAX BASES AND CHANGES IK THE 
lOWi ..TAX. STRUCTURE 07HR THE PAST DECADE 
The yield of a tax system depends on the definition of the tax base, 
the groijth of the tax base, and tax rates. Since the state tax system has 
been subject to nwierous base and rate changes over the past decade, an 
atteinpt "will be made in this chapter to define the significant base and 
rate changes of the major tax sources. This must be done before the 
responsiveness of the tax system to economic changes can be evaluated. In 
the last part of the chapter a general description of the Iowa tax 
structure and its composition will, be given. 
State and Local Tax Bases 
The various state tax bases will be discussed in general terms (15), 
without going into minute detail, for the sales and use tax, state indi­
vidual income tax, state corporate income tax, property taxes, cigarette 
tax, insurance premium tax, motor vehicle fuel tax, and the insurance tax. 
The receipts from the other taxes are relatively small and wiH not be 
discussed. 
Iowa individual income tax base 
The income tax base for Iowa is defined as: 
TI = AGI - ED - D 
IT = r(Tl) - C 
where 
TI = Taxable income 
AGI = Adjusted gross income 
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FD = Federal tax deduction 
D = Deductions (either iterd.zed or standard) 
IT = State income tazc 
r = Income tax rate structixre 
C = Dependency or personal credits 
In estimating the responsiveness of state income taxes, personal income is 
commonly used instead of AGI because it is more readily available and is 
a good index of the economic activity in a state. There is, however, a 
considerable difference between AGI (as defined for federal income tax 
piorposes) and personal income. The major difference between AGI and 
personal income is in the treatment of transfer payments. Transfer pay­
ments such as social security payments, unemployment condensation, etc., 
are included in personal income but not in AGI. Personal contributions 
for social insurance are included in AGI but not in personal income. 
Employer contributions to retirement systems, life insurance and medical 
insurance are included in personal income but not in AGI. Income received 
in the form of goods and services is included in personal income but not 
in AGI. 
AGI for state taxing purposes is nearly identical -tâ-th that defined 
for federal incomc l-axes, the sria;jor exception being interest on federal 
bondc, which is excluded, and interest on state bonds, which is included. 
Itemized deductions include all federal tax deductions except the state 
income tax. The optional standard deduction is 5 percent of income id.th a 
maximum limit of $250. Federal income tax payments are allowed as a 
deduction on all returns. A personal income tax credit of $15 and a 
dependency credit of $10 are also allowed. A discrepancy exists between 
' V'/V V. /.'//; / /. / // ./// // • 
the amount of AGI reported on federal returns and Iowa returns. Several 
factors may be influential: change of residence i-.-ithin a tazcpaying year, 
difference in conpliance, and the difference between AGI as defined for 
state and federal incoitie ta:< purposes (exclusion of interest on federal 
bonds and the inclusion of interest on state bonds). 
Over the period under consideration, 1958-59 to 1967-68, no major 
legal changes in the tax base were encountered. Several smaller changes 
have occurred, but these were considered insignificant. This statement 
must be qualified, however, because Iowa allows the deduction of all 
federal income tajces paid from adjusted gross income. Hence, any changes 
in the federal tax system have an appreciable effect on the Iowa tax base. 
Significant changes in the federal tax system occurred in 1961; and 
1965. These adjustments are considered only in the aggregate. The federal 
surcharge of 10 percent effective from April 1, 1968, does not enter the 
period under discussion. Furthermore, the federal surcharge is supposedly 
only of short-term duration, so it should not affect projections of future 
state income tax receipts. 
The state ta:c rates undervxent two major changes during the period 
1958-59 to 1967-68. Erom 1958-59 to 196it-65, the rates were : 
0.75^ on the 1^*^ $1,000 of taxable income 
1.50^ on the 2^^ $1,000 of taxable income 
2.25^ on the 3^*^ $1,000 of taxable income 
3.00^ on the $1,000 of taxable income 
3.75^ on the 5^^ to n"^^ .'Î3l,000 of taxable income 
For the period 1965-66 to I966-67, the tax rates were changed in the 
upper taxable income brackets. The same rates applied on taxable income 
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-ap to ;'>9,000. Tameable income in the 10^^ to n"^^ $1,000 i-;as taxed at a 
rate of lu50 percent. 
The state tax rates were again changed starting i-âth the 1967-68 
income tax year. The rates remained "unchanged for persons filing vjith 
adjusted gross incomes up to the $1,000. In the higher income groups 
the rates were as follows: 
3.75î2 on the 5"^^ to $1^000 of taxable income 
h'SO% on the 8"^^ to 9^^ $1,000 of taxable income 
5.2B% on the 10"^^ to n"^^ $1,000 of taxable income 
There was thus a marked tendency toifard a more progressive state 
income t<ax rate structure. 
Another important aspect that must be evaluated in the analysis of 
state income tax liabilities over time is the quality of administration, 
but it is difficult to evaluate it cuantitively. It can, however, be said 
that the introduction of the i-iithholding of state income taz-ces by the 
employer (as in the case of the federal income tax) has substantially 
increased the efficiency of administration of the state income tax system. 
Withholding started on January 1, 1966 ( 20), and indications are that the 
fuH benefit of this provision %'Zas not fully realized during the first 
yeai- of its operation, because of the novelty of the provision on the 
state level with respect to viithholding agencies. Aggregate data and 
qualitative information indicate an increase in the efficiency of adminis­
tration between the first and second year of the new method of collection. 
"i-Jithholding increased compliance both of individuals who filed 
regularly and of individuals who had''not previously complied with the 
state tsv: laws. The number of state returns also increased because even 
2^ 
ind2.vidi:n,ls Kho previously v;ere not required to file a return^ filed 
under the provision of i-d-thholding to claijii a refund on tacces v.-ithheld "by 
the employer. Part-time vorkers, especially students^ fall into this 
caterory. The population covered by the pre-i-j-ithholding period is there­
fore not quite coirparable to the population covered under the •vd.thh.olding 
provision. 
The sales tax credit against the state income tax liability intro­
duced in 1967 (2li), to decrease the regressiveness of the new 3 percent 
sales tax, Tjas in full effect for only one year, then fell into disfavor. 
This aspect iv-ill thus not be considered (27). 
lo'-ra corporate income tax base 
The factors limiting the corporate tax base are the exemption of 
specific corporations and the method by i-xhich taxable income is apportioned 
for multi-state firms in loi-ra. The major exemption was state and national 
banks. The major reason for the low productivity of corporate income tax 
in loi'ja, however, is the method by which the multi-state income is 
apportioned for tazcing purposes. 
The apportionment formula may be stated as follows: 
AP^g X SR = TI_ 
TIj + IB- = HT CI]. 
wnere 
= Corporate profit from all operations in the U. S. 
IB = Iowa bonds and all such income directly attributable to 
lovia and other states 
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APyg = Apport-ionable profits in the U. S. 
SR = Sales ratio of loifa sales to sales elsewhere 
TIj = Apportioned taxable income to Iowa 
.IBj = Iowa bonds and all such income directly attributable 
to Iowa 
NTCIj = Taxable corporate income in Iowa 
Iowa uses a 1-factor apportionment method—namely a sales factor— 
compared to some states that use either a 2- or 3-factor formula. Because 
of the single factor sales allocation formula, firms with equal sales and 
net profit pay widely different tax bills, simply because of the destination 
of their sales. If the sales are to out-of-state destinations, the entire 
income from such sales is exempt. It would seem difficult to defend the 
position that benefits derived from public services provided to business or 
the capacity oi: willingness of firms to support these services, is a 
function solely of the destination of their sales. 
Little can be said about the responsiveness of a state corporate 
income tax based on either a 2- or 3-factor formula, because of a lack of 
data on this aspect. It seems highly unlikely that the responsiveness of 
the corporate income tax i-d.ll be smaller under a 2- or 3-factor apportion­
ment formula than that found based only on the sales factor. Wo empirical 
evidence is available to evaluate this hypothesis. 
Receipts from the state corporate income tax have increased signifi-
'cantly over the past decade due to economic changes and, more significantly, 
because of tax rate changes and a base change. 
The following changes were made in the state corporate income tax: 
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ICffoctivc January 1, 19^9, the tax rate on lova corporate 
income vjas increased from. 2 to 3 percent. 
FroiTt January 1, I96I4. to 1966, the Iowa corporate income tax 
rate t-ias increased to Ii percent. 
Effective January 1, I967, taxable Iowa corporate incomes are 
taxed on the basis of a graduated scale of L percent on the first 
$25)000, 6 percent on income between $25^001 and $100,000, and 8 
percent on income above $100,001 (2U). 
With the graduated rate scales, a base change was enacted. Prior to 
1967, corporations were allowed to deduct 100 percent of their federal tax 
payinents from taxable income. Since January 1, 1967, only 50 percent of 
federal tax payments is deductible. 
Property ta>: base 
The property tax base in Iowa is not general in the sense that a tax 
is le\àed on all tangible and intangible property. In fact, the more 
recent trends of property taxation in lovia are toivard a tax on real estate. 
The taxable tangible property includes most residential and business real 
estate and various forms of personal property. 
I&jor exempt tangible properties are property owned by governments, 
including municipal utilities and fair organizations, and property owned 
by charitable, educational, religious, and scientific organizations. 
The generally held view is that these exeinptions shift the tax burden 
to other taxpayers. This is so because of the fact that a county, for 
instance, must raise a predetermined amount of revenue. Tax exempt 
property therefore results in a higher millage on taxable property to 
supply "the needed revenue. It might result in potential hardships on 
coranxmities vjhere exempt property constitutes a large share of the total 
property. For a complete description of the equity aspects of exemptions, 
see I-Ieyer (I4IO. 
Various forms of personalty are exempt because of tradition or 
convention, or because of the difficulty of assessing these properties. 
The major exemptions include crops in the hands of producers for less than 
one year; cattle less than one year old, sheep and swine less than nine 
months old; poultry; farm machinery up to $300 in assessed value; the 
portion of manufacturers' inventories that represents the cost of parts 
and materials embodied in the output; tools of trade; private libraries; 
household furniture up to $300 of assessed value. In practice the only 
household properties which were assessed were electrical appliances and 
musical instruments. 
Apart from the exemptions, certain credits are allowed» The most 
important is the homestead credit on otJner occupied dwellings, which 
amounts to 2$ mills on $2,500 of the assessed value of such dwellings. 
There is also an agricultural land tax credit which pays a portion of the 
school fund levy in excess of 2$ mills. 
Provision is also made for the partial reimbursement to local govern­
ments for the revenue lost because of the various veterans* exez^tions. 
These exemptions amount to $7^0 of assessed value of taxable property for 
veterans of liorld ¥ar I,, while veterans of VJorld War II, the Korean Mar, 
and various military actions in the 1920*5 and l?30*s are allowed exesro-
tions up to $500 of assessed value. Larger exeicptions are allowed for 
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veterans of earlier wars. Five percent of state liquor store gross sales 
is earmarked for the irdJitary service tax fund. 
Intangible taxable property is relatively sinall in magnitude because 
of exemptions and underreporting. Items covered in the tax laws include 
savings accounts, shares in out-of-state building and loan associations, 
shares and stock in most out-of-state corporations and a variety of bonds, 
mortgages, annuities, and mature life insurance policies. These intan­
gibles are taxed at 1 mill. Before 1961; it "was 6 mills, but 5 mills were 
replaced by a 0.75 percent increase in state individual income tax on 
taxable income above $9,000. 
Banlcs are assessed at 60 percent of capital stock after deducting 
the value of the real estate o%-3ied. Savings and loan associations are 
assessed on the basis of their gross shares after deducting the indebtness 
of all borroidjig members. Bank stocks are taxed at 6 mills, and shares of 
building and loan associations are ta;ced at 2 mills of assessed value. 
The method of taxing banks is presently under review by the 63rd General 
Assembly. 
A major change in the property tax base i-jas enacted in 196? (26). 
'I'h ' "C-jor purpose of these changes was to provide a method for general 
pi-o%;jr uy "La:: replacement and equalization. 
The measures to achieve property tax replacement are: 
(1) The personal property tax on household goods (electrical appli­
ances, musical instruments, etc.) t-xas repealed. An appropriate state fund 
was created to compensate the local taxing bodies for the loss of revenue 
under this provision. During the fiscal year 1967-68, $5.3 million "vra.s 
refunded to local units. 
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(2) The first $2,500 of the taxable assessed value of reported 
personal property h:as exempted from the property tax levy. Each property 
oimer is entitled to only one exemption on his property regardless of the 
location(s) of the property in Iowa. 
Revenue is appropriated from the state general fund to replace local 
revenue loss through this provision. The refunds under this provision 
amoTonted to $27.6 million for the 1967-68 tax year. 
(3) To relieve the property tax bturden of loiv-income taxpayers over 
65 years of age, a special tax credit tjas established. In addition to 
the homestead credit, a property o>mer over 65 vâth a family income "below 
$3,500 i-jill receive a credit, which i-jill essentially freeze his property 
tax liability at the level it was in 1967 or the year he became 65 years 
of age. 
(U) The agricultural land tax credit was increased from $15 million 
to $18 million. 
(5) The major portion of local government expenditures go to 
education, and the greatest property tax relief contençilated was in the 
area of increased state-aid to local schools. Provision was made to refund 
liO percent of the loi-ra income tax paid to the county of origin. An 
additional $111 million tias appropriated for 1967-68 to local school units. 
This figure i-riJJL be subject to annual adjustment. Previously, state aid 
to local schools amounted to $55 million. 
(6) To achieve more equal assessment practices among co-unties, it is 
required that all real and tangible personal property be assessed at 27 
percent of its act-ool value. The actual value of all property subject to 
assessment and taxation shall be fair and reasonable market value of 
property. 
Retail sales tax 
A ta:c is paid on the sale of tangible personal property sold at 
retail in the state to consumers or users. The sales tax includes some 
items generally considered services, such as the furnishing and service 
of gas, electricity, water, and communication services, and all sales of 
tickets of admission to places of amusement and athlctic events. Since 
the sale of building materials to owners or builders for the 
création of bui].dings, alteration, repair, and improvement of real 
property has been taxable. This also includes purchases by the manu­
facturers, where these materials are used in the performance of construc­
tion contracts or any other purpose other than resale or processing. 
Specific exermtions are gross receipts from transportation services; 
tickets of admission to state, county, or local fairs or such receipts 
from charitable, educational, or religious institutions, where the entire 
proceeds go to these institutions, and the trade-in value which is not in 
excess of the original purchase price, provided that proper records are 
kept. 
A retail sale is defined as sales to a consumer or user for any 
purpose, other than for processing or resale. This includes the sale of 
gas, vra.ter, and communications services to retail consumers or users. It 
does not include commercial fertilizer or; agricultural limestone, and 
electricity, or steam used in the processing of tangible personal property 
for the ultimate retail sale. 
Items purchased at retail and used for processing are exempt from the 
sales ta::. Processing is defined as tangible personal property, vrhich 
becomes an integral part of such property intended to be sold at retail. 
This définition is commonly called the "physical ingredient rule." 
Changes in the retail sales tax base since 1950 have been relatively 
few and only the major changes are described. Effective July 1, 1955? 
the sales tax rate was increased from 2 to 2.5 percent, but the rate t-ra.s 
again reduced to 2 percent from June 30, 15*57. Effective July Ii, 1955, 
gross receipts from bowling alleys ifere defined as a retail sale, and as 
of J-uly 1, 1955; retail sales of beer and cigarettes were no longer tax 
exenrot, 
A sales tax exemption i-ias granted to farmers on materials used in 
the production of agricultural products for the market as of July L, 1957. 
Specific items covered under this provision are materials used for disease 
and weed control, insect control, the health promotion of livestock or 
plants as well as fuel consumed in ir^lements of husbandry engaged in 
agricultural production. 
In 1965, hotel services were defined as taxable under the retail 
sales tax, effective July 1, 1965 (20). A significant change in the sales 
tax iras enacted in 1967. Effective from October 1, 1967, the sales tax 
rate was increased to 3 percent and the sales tax base i-ias extended to 
certain selected services (2I1.). Two of the most important taxable services, 
namely sales tax on new construction and advertising, were repealed, 
effective July 1, 1969 (28). 
Use ta:-: 
The use ta:c serves as a complement to the sales tax. Use taxes 
prevent the potential sales tax avoidance by out-of-state pixrchasers and 
cives some degree of protection to merchants in the border areas of the 
state. 
Tho-use tax is divided into three major categories: 
(1) use tax paid directly by users (consumers use tax) 
(2)  use tax paid by out-of-state sellers for the sales to Iowa 
residents ivhere the transaction is subject to tax (retail use tax) 
(3) use taxes collected on new motor vehicles and trailers (motor 
vehicles use tazc) 
Specific items exempt from use tax are personal property subject to 
the sales ta:c or items on which the state imposes a special tax and 
tangible personal property not readily available in lovja and which is used 
directly in the fabrication, compounding, manufacturing, or securjjng of 
tangible personal property, intended to be sold ultimately at retail. 
This provision is commonly knox-m as the "not readily available clause," 
The major change enacted, in the use tax was the temporary increase in 
the tax rate similar to the sales tax. The latest change T-xas the increase 
in tax rate from 2 percent to 3 percent and the repeal of the "not readily 
available clause," effective October 1, 196? (21;), 
Cigarette tax base 
This ta:c is imposed on all cigarettes used in loi-za. Cigarettes are 
divided into three different classes. A, B, and C, depending on the weight 
of the cigarettes per 1,000. Different tax rates apply to the different 
3h 
classes, "but since nost of the cigarettes sold in Iowa fallJ. in class A, 
for all practical purposes the cigarette tax base can be considered as 
that for class A cigarettes. 
No ïïiajor changes in the tax base have occurred since 1950, and 
changes in the ta): yield were almost cxclxisively due to rate changes. 
The folloiiTing rate increases wore enacted: 
Increase in the tax rate from 2 cents per pack of 20 cigarettes 
to 3 cents, effective Jmie 30, 15*53. 
Effective July ii, 1959, the tax rate was h cents per pack. 
Effective July i;, 1963, the tax rate was 5 cents per pack. 
Effective July h, 1965; the tax rate was 8 cents per pack (17). 
ihe most recent change vas to 10 cents per pack, starting August 1, 
1967 (2k). 
Insurance premium tax base 
The tax base consists of 2 percent of the gross amount of premiums 
received during the previous year by life insurance companies covering 
risk, insured in Iowa. A similar tax applies to coiroanies other than life 
insurance companies on contracts of insurance in connection i-iith business 
done in the state, including insurance on property in the state. 
The major exclusions from the tax base are fraternal beneficiary 
associations and non-profit hospital and medical service corporations. 
The only significant change in the base has been the inclusion of 
county mutual insurance organizations since January 1, 1966 (22), 
Fuel tax base 
The fuel tax base will be described as it has existed since 1953. 
Effective July 1, 1953, a tax increase from ij. to 5 cents per gallon 
on motor vehicle fuel x^as enacted. Correspondingly, a 6 cent tax i-zas 
imposed on all fuel oil used by motor vehicles on state highways and on 
fuel oil used in any maintenance or construction "work paid for from public 
funds. 
Motor vehicle fuel is defined as any petroleum product used in 
internal combustion engines, e.g., gasoline, kerosene, naphtha, distillate, 
gas oil, tractor fuel, benzine, bensol, and liquefied gas. Fuel oil is 
defined as motor vehicle fuel capable of propelling motor vehicles on 
public highways, such as kerosene, distillate, diesel fuel, and gas, 
A refund on motor vehicle fuel tax is given to anyone operating 
stationary engines, farm tractors, aircraft, boats, or for any other 
purpose, except vehicles intended to be used on public highways. 
The rate increases were as follows: 
Effective July 1, 1955,.the motor vehicle fuel tax was increased 
to 6 cents per gallon, and the tax on fuel oil to 7 cents per gallon. 
As of July 1, 1965, the tax on motor vehicle fuel was increased 
to 7 cents, and that on fuel oil to 8 cents per gallon (18). 
Inheritance tax base 
Ho attempt TO'.11 be made here to define the coirç^licated inheritance 
tax base (15). It is sufficient for our purposes to know that the tax 
base and rates were revised effective July It, 1965 (21). 
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Iowa Tazc Structtzre 
In this section, a brief description of the composition of the loiva 
tax system t-âll be given as it relates to the actual tax collections, the 
composition of total tax revenue, and the "tax burden." The gro"Vjth aspects 
i-iill be discussed in chapter four. 
Table 3.1 show's the growth in state and local tax revenue from 1958-
59 to 1968-69. Over the period, the actual revenue collections have more 
than doubled. The increase in income, sales, use, and cigarette tax was 
relatively greater than property tax revenues. As far as magnitudes are 
concerned, the property tax kept its position of dominance in the state-
local tax system. 
It is perhaps more illuminating to study the ratio of state-local 
rough index of the burden of taxation in the economy. Table 3.2 shows 
that the ratio of state-local tax revenue to personal income stayed 
relatively constant iri-th no distinct upvjard or downi-jard trend. A detailed 
examination of this aggregate ratio does not bring out any systematic 
correlation between fluctuations in Y and T. Even if such a correlation 
does exist, it wo-old not provide evidence of the degree of the responsive­
ness of the tax system, as there were several changes in the bases and 
rates over the time period. The only general conclusion that can be drai^n 
from these aggregates is that the tax effort made by the state did not 
change signnificantly over the period. 
Table 3.3 shows the changes in the relative importance of different 
tax sources over time. The data clearly shows the trend av.-ay from property 
taxes since 1966, >n.th income and sales taxes becoming more important. 
tax revenue to state personal income This ratio may be used as a 
Table 3.1. Iowa tax revenue for fiscal years to 1968-6? in current dollars ($000,000) 
Year 
JL/pV VX UOA. 
59-60 60-61 61-62 62-63 63-6).( 65-65 65-66 66-67 67-60 68-69 
Incorie® 
Individual 36,3 36.9 37.6 lil.8 hk'6 li5.3 57.7 71.2 81.5 91.5 105.1 
Corporate 2.5 3.7 h.H li.3 h»h 1|.7 5.9 7.8 11.9 19.0 2k.5 
Sales^ 65.3 68.2 68.6 69.1 72.3 73.2 76.1 85.2 91.3 123. a 173.6 
Useb 12.0 12.7 15.3 15.0 I5.)4 16.6 17.3 20.6 21.5 29.1 38.1 
Cigarette® 8.!| 11.3 11.6 11.9 12.1 llf.li 15.2 23.7 2U.1 28.8 28.9 
Insui'ance premium® 7.0 7.5 7.9 6.3 8.8 9.6 10.3 11.5 12.1) 13.5 Hi.5 
Inheritance® 6.6 7.2 7.1( 8.1 8.3 9.I1 10.0 12.1 12.1 15.1 15.2 
Beer® 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.1) 3.14 3.5 3.6 5.0 5.I1 
Liquor® •• - M M - 3.1 3.9 k,6 5.1 3.5 3.6 
Equipment car®, 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Chain store® - — » » ' - - - -
Tobacco product® - - - - - — - - - 0.6 0.7 
Real estate transfer® - - - - - - - - - O.li 1.0 
Fuel® 69.2 7k.5 73.0 72.7 75.5 77.1 79.2 98.6 101.7 105.6 106.lt 
Property" 279.9 308.8 3k5.0 357.5 378.1 399.6 121.1 lili3.0 L95.6 178.9 5oh.il 
TOTAL li90.lt 53I1.I 57I4.I 592.1 622.9 656.8 700.5 781.9 860.9 911.5 1015.6 
^Source: (33)o 
^Source: (31). 
^Source; (32). 
^Source: (32), 
Table 3.2, The tax-income ratios for the various taxes 1958-5? to I968-69 
]ype of tax 
,.c 
Year 
50-59 59-60 6O-6I 61-62 62-63 63-6I1 6i(-.65 65-66 66-67 67-68 68-69 
Income^ 
Individual 
Corporate 
Sales" 
Use° 
Ci£;arette® 
Insurance premium'" 
Inheritance® 
Beer® 
liquor® 
Equipment car® 
Chain store® 
Tobacco products® 
Real estate transfer® 
Fuel® 
Property 
TOTAL 
.0069 .0069 .0069 .0073 .007k .0071 .0087 .009k .0098 .0107 .0117 
.0005 .0007 .0008 .0007 .0007 .0007 .0009 .0010 .OOlli .0022 .0026 
.012b .0128 .0125 .0120 .0120 .0115 .Olllj .0112 .0109 .oikk .016k 
.0023 .002k .0023 ,0026 .0026 .0026 .0026 .0027 .0026 .003k .ooko 
.0016 .0021 .0021 .0021 .0020 .0023 .0023 .0031 .0029 .003k .0031 
.0013 .0013 .OOlli .0011; .0011, .0015 .0015 .0015 .0015 .0016 .0015 
.0013 .0013 .ooaJi .0011, .0011, .0015 .0015 .0016 .001k .0018 .0016 
.0006 .0006 .0006 .0006 .0005 .0005 .0005 .0005 .000k .0006 .0006 
- : - - -
.0005 .0006 .0006 .0006 .000k .000k 
.0132 .011,0 .0133 .0127 .0126 .0122 .0118 .0130 .0122 .0123 .0113c 
.0536 .0580 .0630 .0621 .0629 .0629 .0633 .0585 .059k .0559 .05362 
.09k3 .look .101,8 .1030 .1037 .1032 .1052 .1033 .1031 .1068 .1085 
Source; (33% 
Source ; (31). 
Source: (35). 
^Source: (32). 
Table 3»3. The composition of Iowa tax sources 19^8-^p to ip68-69 (percentage) 
, ' Year 
Type of tax — 
58-55* 5P-60 60-61 61-62 62-63 63-6h 6ii-65 65-66 66-67 67-60 68-69 
Income^ 
Individual 7.ho 6.90 6.51: 7.05 7.16 6.89 8.23 9.10 9.L6 10.00 10.29 
Corporate 0.50 0.6? 0.76 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.81 0.99 1.38 2.07 2.36 
Sales^ 13.31 12.76 • 11.9b 11.67 11.60 11.114 10.86 10.89 10.60 13.119 17.00 
Useb 2.) (It 2.37 2.66 2.53 2.1(7 2.52 2.1(6 2.63 2.L9 3.18 3.73 
Cigarette^ 1.71 2.11 2.02 2.00 1.9h 2.19 2.16 3.03 2.79 3.II1 2.83 
Insurance premium^ l.lf2 i.ko 1.37 1.1(0 1.1(1 1.1(6 1.1(7 1.1(7 1.1(1( 1.1(7 l.k2 
Inheritance^ 1.3l| 1.3k 1.28 1.36 1.33 1.13 1.1(2 1.5k 1.1(0 1.65 1.1(9 
Beer® 0.63 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.1(8 o.Lh o.hl 0.5k 0.53 
liquor® - - - - - 0.1(7 0,55 0.58 0.59 0.38 0.35 
Equipment car® 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Chain store® - » - - — - - - M - -
Tobacco products® - - - - - - - - M 0.06 0.07 
Real estate transfer® - - - - - - - P» 0.0k 0.10 
Fuel® 1)4.11 13.9a 12.71 12.27 12.12 11.78 11.30 12.61 11.81 11.5k 10. k2 
Property 57.07 57,81 60.09 60.37 60,69 60.83 60.15 56.65 57.56 52.36 k9.kO 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
^Source: (33) 
^Source : (31) 
^Source: (35) 
^Source: (32) 
ho 
Table 3M, Composition of Iowa tax revenue classified in aggregate groups 
Year Property Tax Outlay-type Tax^ Income-type Taaf" 
1958-59 57.07# 33.60# 7.91% 
1959-60 57.82 33.21 7.60 
1960-61 60.09 31.28 7.32 
1961-62 60.38 30.15 7.79 
1962-63 60.69 30.09 7.87 
1963-61 60.&1 30.10 7.61 
1961-65 6o.l6 29.32 9.08 
1965-66 56.66 31.68 10.10 
1966-67 57.57 30.17 10.87 
1967-68 52.37 33.8a 12.08 
1968-69 . U9.U0 36.36 12.65 
^State corporate income tax and state individual income tax. 
^Sales tax, use tax/ cigarette tax, insurance premium tax, "beer tax, 
liquor tax, tobacco products tax, and fu^ tax. 
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CHA.PTER h.  RESPONSr\rENESS OF THB IOWA TAX STRUCTURE 
In the preceding chapter descriptive data irere presented to indicate 
the tax bases and the relative iiTÇ)ortance of the various tax sources. In 
this chaptcr the responsiveness of the major tax sources "with respect to 
economic growth in the state is analyzed. 
The estimating procedures used in this section rely heavily on the 
single equation, income elasticity approach "with movements in the state 
personal income and population as the major explanatory variables. For 
each receipt category a separate estimate has been made based on uniform 
economic and population assumptions. 
The approach obviously suffers from the defect of partial analysis 
in that it neglects the dynamic interrelationships. However, to some 
extent certain policy variables are included, which are mainly in the 
form of either tax rate adjustments or changes in the relevant tax bases 
of different taxes. An attempt t-ôll also be made to quantify some of the 
administrative changes that occurred over the period under consideration, 
Finallj'- an assessment of the iz^act of the 1967 tax structure changes on 
the responsiveness of the Iowa tax system will be made, 
loi-za individual income tax 
The responsiveness of the Iowa individual income tax is studied in 
three phase's : 
(1) the responsiveness of the income tax based on historical data 
(2) the responsiveness of the state income tax based on the federal 
income tax 
ii2 
(3) £ simulation model to assess the responsiveness of the income tax 
under various sijnulated changes in the "policy variables" available under 
the state personal income tax. 
The income elasticity of the lov/a income tax 
The measurement of the responsiveness of state income tax payments to 
changes in income, over time, is complicated by changes in the income tax 
base as well as changes in the state income tax rates. To deal "with such 
a varying tax structure two approaches are possible. The tax base can be 
reconstructed by taz-cable income brackets and then the different rate 
structures can be applied to the resulting income distribution, or state 
income tazc payments can be dealt >jith in the aggregate. The latter 
approach i-jill be followed here. Data by taxable income bracket will be 
used in some instances to adjust the aggregate income tax series. 
Aggregate income tax payments in lo^ia can functionally be specified 
as: 
rr = f ( Y, AGI, FT, D, R, C, I, A ) (l^.l) 
where 
Zl = Total state income tax payments 
Y = Total state personal income 
AGI = Total state adjusted gross income 
FT = Federal income ta:c payments which are deductible in 
calculating Iowa income tax liabilities 
D = State income tax deductions 
R = State income tax rate structure 
C = State income taj; credits 
ii3 
I = Some measure of the distribution of income 
A = Administrative changes 
Such a general approach -will not be folio-wed. Instead some of the 
variables i-ri-ll be consolidated to obtain a more manageable model. This 
•frrf-ll be done by reconstructing an aggregate income tax series under a 
uniform tax base and rate structure. Little vjiH be done t-jith respect to 
the distribution of income variable in this section. With these adjust­
ments the functional relationship in equation (ii.l) can be simplified to: 
IT = f ( Y, A ) (1.2) 
The variable representing administrative changes (A) -ivill be retained in 
order to evaluate the effect of the change in collection methods which 
started in January 1966. 
In order to construct a consistent series of income tax statistics it 
ivas decided to evaluate the income elasticity of the state income tax 
•under the 1965 rate and base structure for the period 1958-59 to 1967-68. 
This %-zas necessary, because most of the tax base and rate changes occurred 
after 1965 and also because detailed data were available to simulate 
income tax payments as it would have been under the 1965 tax structure. 
Changes in (AGI), (FT), (D), (E), and (C) over this period had to be 
standard!zed. 
No significant changes occurred in the definition of either (AGI) or 
(D) over this period. Significant changes in the ISSh and 1965 federal 
income ta:c laws are reflected in the state income tax liabilities for the 
corresponding years. This interdependency between state and federal 
income ta^: payments is due to the fact that federal taxes are deductible 
in calculating net taxable income in Iowa. It was therefore necessary to 
adjust the reported federal tax liabilities for the period starting viith 
1958-59 to I96U-65 to the federal income tax structure as it existed in 
1965-66 and thereafter. For this purpose a simulation model used by the 
Internal Revenue Service (5). was applied to convert the I96L federal tax 
liabilities to uhat they would have been under the 1965 rate structure. 
Federal income tax revenue was multiplied by (l.OOO - 0,073). A similar 
adjustment VTas necessary for collections in 1963 and prior years where 
the multiplicant was (l.OO - 0.19). The difference between calculated 
and reported federal tax deductions t^as then multiplied by the average 
state income tax rate for the specific year and state income tax collec­
tions adjusted accordin^y. To adjust state tax payments to the 1965 rate 
structure, the income tax statistics were retabulated on the basis of the 
taxable income brackets for the years 1966-6? and 1967-68. With this 
breakdown available it was possible to simulate the income tax liabilities 
for these years under the 1965 rate structure. A corresponding adjust­
ment is made for the increase of $2.50 per dependent in the dependency 
credit, which became effective for the 1967-68 tax year. The underlying 
income tax statistics and the adjusted time series data are presented in 
the Appendix, Table 6.1 and. Table 6.2, respectively. 
The following regression equations were fitted to the reconstructed 
time-series data:^ 
^Throughout this chapter the following conventions are followed: The 
standard error of the coefficients are indicated below the relevant coef­
ficients , in parenthesis. The significance levels of the corresponding 
variables are indicated by ('""^), for a significance level of 0.01, (*) for 
'a significance level of 0,05, and no superscript in the case of non-
significance . 
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wnere 
log ZT. = -9.1tL68"'"' + 1.7^7^ ]Los Y+ .0036^8 D,. 
il.O^ Jh) (0.1083) (0.0228) 
+ .02108 Dy_ xn (U.3) 
(.02362) o7-Gb 
r? = .9917 
•V.U. = 3.59 
Log IT. = -9.7227"""' + 1.7759 Log Ï (l.L) 
^ ( .5747) ( .05860) P" 
= .9913 
V.N. = 3.20 
IT = State income tax liabilities 
Yp = State personal income 
. = Dummy variable, representing the effect on IT during 
66-67 the first year of iri.thholding 
D, .0 = Briirany variable, representing the effect on IT during 
of-00 second year of -[Withholding 
t = 1958-59 to 1967-68 
In equation (ii..3) neither dummy variable is significant at the 5 per­
cent level, indicating that no major shift occurred in the intercept coef­
ficient due to i-jithholding. This clearly indicates that the substantial 
increase in the state income tax collections for I966-67 and 1967-68 -[-ras 
mostly due to changes in the tax rate structure and personal income groi-rêh. 
In equation (h.h) the dummy variables -were eliminated and the 
resultant income elasticity of the Iowa income tax under the 1965 rate 
structure amounted to 1.7759. This is a surprisingly high income 
elasticity and it was therefore decided to determine "whether the high 
U6 
incozie elasticity is the result of moveiaents in the tax base or due to 
the rate structure. 
For this purpose the total income elasticity of the state income tax 
vas divided into tivo coirroonents: 
v.- @1111- e ïi) (J ?)<«> 
vxhers 
e^j. = Incorae elasticity of the Iowa income tax payments 
TI = Taxable income 
T = Income tax payments 
Y = Personal income 
dTI Y 
= The elasticity of taxable income "Kith respect to 
personal income (base elasticity) 
d? TI \ 
~ 1 = The elasticity of the income tax ijith respect to 
taxable income (rate elasticity) 
The foUo'i^ing simple regressions tiere fitted to see which of the two 
components of e^^^ is responsible for the high income elasticity: 
Log TI = -0.1:038 + 1.0136 Log Y (h.6) 
(0.5767) (0.05889) P 
= .9738 
T.N. = 1.39 
Log T = -8.7332'"''' + 1.722ii Log Tl'"" (h.7)  
(0.7226) ( .07576) 
r2 = .98U7 
V.N. = l.iiS 
U7 
l-'roKi equations (lu6) and (i;.?) it is obvious that the relatively high 
income elasticity of the income tax is not the result of a high "base 
elasticity, but rather due to the high income tax rate elasticity of 
1.722b. The tax base (taxable income) indicated a unitary elasticity, 
impljo-ng that taxable income change proportionally idLth personal income. 
This fact is also reflected in Table 6.1t, indicating that of the 
total increase in state income tax of $52 million between 1958-59 and 
1967-08, ;f)21 million is due to an increase in the average rate of taxation. 
This increase in the average tax rate is mainly due to the progressive 
state income tax rate structure. 
Ho-fiever, the tax system "was changed for the 1966-67 and I967-68 
income tax years. The income elasticity under the 1967 rate structure 
xv-as estimated, but due to the lack of accurate statistics to adjust the 
income tax data for years prior to I966-67, dummy variables vere used to 
estimate the effect of these changes. 
The tax liabilities for 1966-67 were changed to be coii^arable to the 
1967-68 rate structure, and the income tax statistics for 1968-69 were 
included after adjustments were made for the 7.5 percent federal income 
tax surcharge. 
The folloiving regressions were fitted to the data: 
Log IT = -9.18 
(l.Oi-
.03710 X 
(.02027) ' 
= .9932 
v.m = 3.18 
Ii8 
Log it = -9.2186'"'"' + 1.7279 Log Y+ .003727 X . ih.9)  
(1.0275;) ( .1033) ^ (.0021:) 
= .9952 
V-ÎI. = 2.87 
i-:hcre 
X = Dummy variable testing for intercept changes 1958-59 
to 1905-66 indicated by 1, 0 othervjise 
X . = Dummy variable testing for slope changes 1958-59 to 
1965-66 represented by 0 othen-d.se 
In both equations (1;.8) and (L.9), the dummy variable is almost significant 
at the 5 percent level of significance (tg = 1.86) -with the estimated 
t-value in equations (U.8) and (U.9) at 1.60. 
If one is to rely solely on the significance levels of the respective 
coefficients J the conclusion vxould be that the minor structural changes in 
1966 were insignificant. The relatively h-^.gh t-values, however, indicate 
that the effect of these changes can be considered as marginal. 
State income ta:c based on the state federal income tax payments 
A state income tax based on a percentage of the federal income tax 
paid by lovxa residents has considerable appeal because of the greater 
administrative efficiency involved in such an income tax system. Such a 
tax system i-rould of course have a destabilizing influence on state revenue 
if state tax rates are kept constant i-ri-th federal income tax laijs changing, 
but this presents no problem since income tax rates can easily be adjusted. 
Various other special pro-visions -with respect to the specific tax base 
might be considered, but any cocrolications introduced at the state level 
i-:ould greatly reduce the major advantage of such a system, namely adminis-
urative ease. No such special provisions vjill be considered here. The 
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primary interest xcLll be the determination of the responsiveness of a 
state income tax, "based on the federal income tare as it existed in 1967-66. 
Ti-;o general rate struct-ures t-d.ll be considered, namely, a proportional and 
a progressive rate structirre. The choice of a specific rate structxire vas 
subject to the follovjing conditions: 
(1) The state income tax, as it existed under the present system, is 
replaced by the new tax yielding equal revenue for the 1907-68 income tax 
year. 
(2) Ihdi\d.duals icLth an AGI below $3,000 are exempt from state income 
tax. 
(3) In the case of a progressive rate structure it is ^ ecified that 
the income/AGI ratio should be somewhat lower for the lower income groups, 
and approximately the same for the middle income groups with resultant 
higher ratios for the higher income groups. 
These conditions l±tnit the number of possible rate structures. A 
proportional rate of 12.9 percent of the federal income tax payments 
satisfied the specified conditions. In. the case of a progressive rate 
structure the follot-dng structure seems reasonable: 
p percent on federal tax payments from $ 0 to $ 200 
9 percent on federal tax payments from $ 201 to $ UOO 
ll; percent on federal tax paj^ments from $ iiOl to $ 800 
17 percent on federal tax payments from $ 801 to $2,000 
20 percent on federal tax payments from $2,001 and over 
With this rate structure a simulated run was made against the federal tax 
statistics for each individual return. The resultant state income tax 
burden and total tax yield satisfied the stated conditions. Obviously, 
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such à state tco: systcn iratild. "be more responsive than the federal income 
tax because of the progressiveness in the rate struct-ure at the state level. 
The determination of the responsiveness of such a system was compli­
cated bcca-use of the lack of adequate time series data. With the data 
available for just one year it was dccided to use a crosc-sectional 
approach as utilised by I-Iishaii and Dicks-IHroaux (US). They provided a 
proof that, pro\dded one is "i-alling to assume a proportional groi-rth in 
income for each return across the income distribution, future income tax 
payments can be expressed in terms of the initial year quantities. 
The responsiveness of an Iowa income tax based on federal income tax 
payments can then be determined. Assume that the relationship between a 
federal income tso: and income can be defined by a simple exponential 
function: 
T., = 3.1^^ (It.10) 
J. 
where T^ is federal tax payments, a and b^ are constants, and Y is AGI. 
Then the income elasticity of the federal income tax can be expressed 
as; 
Gf - [ ) ( - ) ~ (^-11) 
/dT^\ /Y \ 
i; 
where e^ is the income elasticity of the federal income tax. 
Correspondingly, if the relationship bett-7een state tax payments and 
federal income tax payments can be presented as: 
Tg = cCTjjbs (^^22) 
where subscript (s) indicates the corresponding variables at the state 
level. 
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Then the elasticity of the state income tax "with respect to federal 
" I — ] S] 
tax payments can be presented as: 
'dT^\ /T 
'sf 
\dT,/ 
Cpmbinins equation (li.ll) and equation (U.13) the ixicome elasticity 
of the state income tax can be presented as; 
1^ . h] . . L] (U.al;) 
\ dT^ Tg/ \ dY T^/ 
" Vs 
In the case of a proportional state income tax rate, eqtiation (i;.12) 
might be redefined as: 
Tg = r (T^) (U.15) 
•where r designates the proportional state income tax rate. 
Then 
= 1 (Il .16) 
implies that -under a proportional rate structtire, .the income elasticity of 
the state income tax i-iould be equal to that of the federal income tax. 
Regression estimates based on the cross-sectional data (see Appendix, 
Table 6.3) are: 
Log T. = -2.9635** + 1.50liO Log (1.17) 
^ ( .01:791) ( .onooii) 
r2 = 0.9990 
Log T = -k.9902"" + 1.7759 Log (2i.l8) 
^ ( .11517) ( .03332) 
r2 = 0.9910 
3'2 
Tlie income elasticity -under a proportional tar rate is eqiial to 1.5. 
Notvjithstcindinpj the relatively high progressive state rate struct-ure, 
equation (ii.l8) indicates that the income elasticity of the state income 
tax increased only 0.27. 
These estimates indicate that the main advantage of this form of 
state income teccation must be based on its administrative ease and not on 
its responsiveness i-ri-th respect to income. With the steeply progressive 
rate structure assumed here, the income elasticity of the income tax is 
about the same as that calculated previously under the present income tax 
system. 
State income tax simulation model 
The income elasticity approach, as used in the previous section, is 
not very interesting, because it ignores some of the state income tax 
policy variables such as the relationship between the federal and state 
income tax payments. 
An ordinary regression model, ifhich includes as indpendent variables 
personal income, federal tax deductions, standard and itemized deductions 
is not very useful, because of the problem of multi-coUinearity (33). 
One alternative way of analyzing these relationships is through some kind 
of simulation model of the lotra. income tax system. Such a simulation model 
should allow for the evaluation of potential policy changes for the base 
year i-.-ithout much difficulty. Behavioral relationships become important 
as soon as dynamic aspects are brought into consideration and the effects 
of certain policy changes over time are required. Specific behavioral 
relationships that are of particular importance in the dynamic context are 
the incarne distribution, the factors that change the income distribution 
over time, the annual distribution of new tazcpaycrs among income groups, 
Khich vculd likely differ from the existing distribution of taxpayers, 
and the grovrth in tax deductions for the various income levels. 
These problems can be circumvented by the unsatisfactory assumption 
of proportional growth in taxable income. More realistic procedures are 
severely hampered by data availability. With the usual data available 
only by AGI income bracket it is impossible to estimate the groifth rate 
of AGI over time. Clearly the increase over a period in the average AGI 
per return is not appropriate for measuring the groirbh experienced by 
returns in a particular bracket. It is entirely possible to find the 
average AGI i-d.thin each bracket (except in the highest) to be approximately 
constant over tiiae, thus indicating nothing about the AGI groi-rbh rate on 
indi^-idual returns. In those cases where the average AGI fji a particular 
bracket does not stay constant, the results are misleading. For example, 
a decrease in the average AGI level -within a specific bracket might well 
be the result of a rapid AGI growth resulting in a movement of returns to 
the next bracket and hence should not be interpreted as a negative groi-ith 
rate. Any attempt to determine the AGI grovrth by AGI bracket must take 
into account the movement of tax returns between ta>: brackets. This is 
not possible tcith data available only by AGI class. 
An analogous problem arises in calculating the groifbh of taxable 
income. A rapid increase in any particular income bracket can result only 
from a rapid increase in AGI (ignoring the unliîcely possibility of deduc­
tions and credits falling drastically), thus producing a movement of 
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returns to the next bracket and lowering the average level of taxable 
income in the original incciae bracket. 
VJales, in a study of federal income tax patterns, demonstrated that 
a nonproportional growth in taxable income exists even id-th a proportional 
AGI grovrbh rate by assuming that the average grovrfch in exemptions in a 
particular bracket is independent of AC-I groirth (65). This study further 
assumes that since deductions are either itemized or standard and since 
the latter is defined as a fixed percentage of AGI ("within narrow limits 
thereafter it becomes a fixed amount), the groi-rth in total deductions per 
return depends on the groi-rbh of itemized deductions per return. 
A relationship is then defined by assuming that for any tameable 
return, the AGI (Y) grows at a rate of (g) and that deductions and execu­
tions combined (Z) grow at a rate (g'). Then the groi-rth in taxable income 
(g") may be calculated as: 
S^tr-1 " S'^t-1 (h.19) 
g" = 
Vi- Vi 
sr - S'Y g'Y. T - g'Z. , Clt.20) u—J- Lr-JL U-» J_ Ti-^J 
- "t-l 
= g: + g - fi' (ho2l) 
1 
Assuming that the average deduction and exengstion per return remains 
constant then 
g î  = 0  
and g" = g (it.22) 
(1 - Z/Y) 
55 
Generally the ratios are high for low income grotçts and low for high 
income groups. The federal income tax statistics for 1966 (63) show Z/Y 
ratios of 76 percent and 15 percent for the $1,000 to $2,000 and the over 
$100,000 AGI brackets, respectively. The effect of such a divergence in 
the grorth of taxable income is significant. For example, assuming a ii 
percent groivth of all AGI levels, growth in taxable income may be calcu­
lated as follows; 
The corresponding Z/T ratios for the Iowa income tax are l6.5 percent and 
h2,2 percent, respectively. This is just the opposite from the federal 
income tax, but can be ascribed to the fact that federal income taxes are 
deductible for Iowa income tax purposes, and the fact that personal 
exemptions on the federal level are replaced by a tax credit on the state 
level. 
The results illustrate that even i-àthout a change in deductions, the 
assumption of proportional AGI grorbh rates could lead to divergent grovrth 
rates in taxable income for different income brackets. The growth rates 
Tjill be slightly moderated in cases where deductions per return have 
increased over time. 
The implementation of a state income tax simulation model 
In order to simulate the Iowa income tax system, a 1 percent sample 
from the I967-68 state income tax returns for pay and no-pay returns was 
draim (see Appendix). ; With. this, sample available'it-was possible, both 
g" = 3^^ " 0.16 for Z/Y = 0.76 (ii.23) 
ik,2h) 
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in the static and dyiiaraic contoxc, to make inferences about the behavior 
of the population under certain specified policy changes. 
The basic identities of such a model are defined as 
- ^ ist 
®iEt - = ®igt (b-27) 
'.•Mere 
ACT. Ad.iur3to<L rro%:i income of the i^^"^ Indilvildual in the 
income at time t 
DS. , = Standard deductions 
X2t 
DI. , = IteiTiized deductions 
xgt 
FD. J = Federal ta:c deductions on loi-ja returns 
NTI. . = Not ta:'%ble income igû 
TR. . = State ta:: rate structure 
C-T. J. = Gross state income ta% 
CD = î'Jimber of dependency credits 
CP = î'îumber of personal credits 
la = Amount deductible per dependent 
n = Amount deductible for personal credits 
To describe the behavior of the above mentioned variables over time, the 
folloi-d-ng sizTplifying assumptions i-iere necessary because of data limitations; 
(1) There ezdsts a proportional rate of groi-rth in AGI across the entire 
population. This procedure is more realistic than the assumption of propor­
tional grovrth in ta>:able income. 
(2) The behavior of standard deductions over time does not present any 
difficulties because it is a fixed absolute amount.. The behavior of item.-
ized deductions over t^e is more difficult to determine. The percentage 
of taxpayers using itemized tax deductions did not change appreciably 
since 1961-62 (Appendix).. This" leaves the behavior of the itemised 
deductions per retizm in the different income groups itself. The per 
capita change in itemized deductions in the different income groxips does 
not show any specific trend over time, and it vas thus decided that the 
best description of the historical data is the mean deduction per return. 
There vrere slight differences among the income groups "with respect to the 
itemized deductions/AGI ratio, but these differences were considered 
insignificant. It was therefore assumed that the marginal increase in 
itemized deductions per dollar increase in AGI "would be equal to the mean 
itemized deduction/AGI ratio. The mean, itemized deduction per return 
amounted to 10.13 percent of AGI for pay returns and 17.12 percent for no 
pay returns. 
(3) Similar difficulties were encountered with the federal taxes 
deductible on Iowa income tax returns. The data published by the federal 
authorities is not coriroarable to the federal tax deductions shown on the 
Iowa income tax returns, due to different filing methods and differences 
in the definition of AGI and compliance, so that the relative detail of 
the federal tax statistics could not be used. The time trends of the 
federal tax were estimated for each AGI group. The data, however, did not 
demonstrate any appreciable trend (Appendix). It i:vas thus - decided that 
the same mean marginal rate of federal income tax deductions was applicable 
to all income groups. The mean marginal federal income tax rate vjas 
estimated at 0.1655 for pay returns and 0.1^95 for no pay returns. 
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The behavior relations can then be defined as: 
"^^igt 4- 1 = (1 + h) 
^^iSt + 1 . 0.022 (AGI-^t + i); DS-gt +1 $2,0 (L.29) 
+ 1 - niict + (a)(h) (k.30) 
^'\gt + 1 = PTigt + (f)(h) AGI.gt (iu3l) 
+ 1 --- ?%iGt + n = TKict (li.32) 
^gt + 1 ^igt + n ~ ^ igt (U.33) 
\gt + 1 - ^igt + n ^igt jk; 
ifhere 
h = Rate of grotrbh in AGI 
d = i-Iean narginal change in itemized deductions 
f = Hean narginal rate of federal taxation 
This is a very aggregative macro model. Notwithstanding this 
aggregativeness, the uses of such a model can be extensive. However, it 
is limited by the amount of detailed data available. As can be seen from 
the previous specifications, o:nly three major aggregates are available, 
namely, adjusted gross income, federal tax deductions, and itemized or 
standard deductions. Apart from the fact that this model is very 
aggregate, the behavioral relationships are very naive because of a lack 
of meaningful time series data. The use of this model for long-run pro­
jections is therefore not advisable. 
Even --â-th these limitations, this type of model can be used produc­
tively in considering the effects of potential changes in the groi-rth rates 
of AGI, the level of federal tazc deductions, the level of itemized and 
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standard deductions, the state inconc tax rate struct-are, and taxable 
incoir.c brackets. These changes can be evaluated for the specific year in 
-•:Iii.ch the sample icas dravjn, or the reaction on specific policies can be 
ascertained over the short run. This type of model can therefore be used 
to estimate the immediate effects of prospective legal changes. 
In this section i-:e are mainly interested in the interrelationship 
beti.-een federal income taic payments and state income tax payments. The 
tj'pes of changes in the tax structixre to be considered include the effect 
of the federal income tax surcharge on loi-xa personal income tax receipts, 
the effect of the elimination of the federal income tax deduction on lovra 
returns, and the effect of the elimination of federal tax deductions on 
the responsiveness of the lovja personal income. The model mH be used in 
conjunction %-d.th the income elasticity model to project state income tax 
payments to 1975. 
In Table Ud the effect of a 10 percent federal surcharge is estimated 
for the income tax year 196? i-3ith other deductions kept constant. The 
effect is shovm only for pay returns since the surtax would have no 
appreciable effect on the no-pay tax returns. 
The 10 percent federal surcharge T-.-ould have decreased the state 
income payments for the 1967 income tax year from $93,955^000 to 
$91,198,000, vihich amounts to a 2.9 percent decrease. This suggests that 
i::arginal changes in the federal tax laws would not affect the state income 
payments very much. 
The revenue loss to the state due to the federal tax deductions on 
Iowa income ta:c returns is much more substantial, la Table k.2 this 
aspect is evaluated. 
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Tabic U.l. The effect of the federal income tax surcharge on the Iowa 
income tax payments for I967 (in $000) 
Federal Tax Deduction State Income Tax 
xncomc Group A.G.I. Regular Regular Regular Regular 
+ surtax + surtax 
1,001- 2,000 23,189 1,231 1,688 n 10 
2,001- 3,000 183,165 17,231 18,952 296 278 
3,001- i.,000 327,837 32,U66 35,710 1,952 1,87k 
U,ooi- 5,000 UU0,19ii 42,019 16,218 3,600 3,k75: 
5,001- 6,000 561,761 56,86k 62,5k7 5,05k 5,75k 
6,001- 7,000 610,037 63,ii6it 69,807 8,197 7,962 
7,001- 8,000 631,llU 6k,221 70,61-1 9,096 8,856 
8,001- 9,000 53li,i;39 19,923 5k,913 8,383 8,187 
9,001-10,000 116,373 50,098 55,107 7,081 6,871 
10,001-15,000 961,697 121,671 133,835 19,957 19,372 
15,001-20,000 306,012 k2,kk9 k6,69k 7,7kk 7,526 
20,001-25,000 163,75k 25,386 27,925 k,658 k,526 
25,001 and over 513,176 100,lk2 110,155 17,026 16,507 
TGT/iL 5,706,369 667,k68 73k,192 93,955 91,198 
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Table b.2. l"he effect on lovra income técc payments of the elimination of 
the federal income tax deduction for 156? ($000) 
Incomc Group A.G.I. 
State 
Federal Taxes 
Not Deductible 
Income Tax 
Federal Taxes 
Deductible 
0- 1,000 19,997 - -
1,001- 2,000 221,278 32 11 
2,001- 3,000 329,551 505 296 
3,001- 1,000 ii31,008 2,891 1,952 
li,ooi- 5,000 187,5kk 5,OU2 3,600 
5,001- 6,000 579,k8l . 8,12k 5,95h 
6,001- 7,000 617,397 10,651: 8,197 
7,001- 3,000 63U,616 11,612 9,096 
8,001- 9,000 536,558 10,179 8,383 
9,001-10,000 117,723 9,333 7,081 
10,001-15,000 968,028 26,183 19,957 
15,001-20,000 306,913 9,980 7,7% 
20,001-25,000 161,623 6,018 a,658 
25,001 and over 517,015 22,127 17,026 
TOTAL 6,291,762 123,280 93,965 
The revenue loss due to the federal tax deduction on state income 
amounted to $29*3 million or 31.2 percent. 
It is also interesting to assess the effect of the federal tax deduc­
tion on the responsiveness of the state income tax. For this purpose the 
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state incorae tax liabilities are projected as it existed under the present 
system and also as it iiould have been vd-th no deduction for federal taxes 
paid. These projections are based on the assumption that there tri-ll be no 
change in the nvmber of Iowa income tax returns filed over the projection 
period. 
Table U.3. The effect of the federal tax deductions on the responsiveness 
of the Iowa income tax 
1967 1970 1975 
Adjusted gross income ($000,000) 6,291 7,28k 9,291 
State income tax payments ($000) 
Federal income tax deductible 
Federal income tax not deductible 
93,956 124,711 
123,28k 161,726 
188,296 
213,719 
1967-1970 1970-1975 
Income elasticity 
Federal tax deductible 
Federal tax not deductible 
2.07 
1.85 
1.97 
1.8U 
Marginal yield income ratio 
Federal taxes deductible 
Federal taxes not deductible 
O
 O
 
.0387 
.0L08 
The results presented above indicate that the effect of the federal 
tax deduction on the responsiveness of the lo^vja income tax is minor. 
Although the income elasticity has not changed significantly, the marginal 
yield-income ratio is probably the more relevant measure in evalu­
ating the effect of the two systems. The marginal increase in tax revenue 
per dollar increase in AGI is substantially higher under a system i-jith no 
deduction of federal income tax paid than the present system. 
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The burden of the lovra. income tax system based on the four proposed 
structures 
in the previous three sections the responsiveness of the loiva income 
tazc system liith respect to income movements "was estimated for four 
different structures. These four tax structures were; the present system, 
a state income tax based on federal income tax payments with a porpor-
tional rate structure, a similar system with a progressive rate structure, 
and a state income tax system with deductibility or federal tax payments 
disallowed. 
Tho rcnponoivoncsc of those foui" income tax systems arc very similar. 
l"t was established that the income elasticity under the present system is 
1.7. Based on the income simulation model it was found that if federal tax 
payments are not deductible on IOTO tax returns, the income elasticity 
showed a slight decrease. A state income tax based on federal income tax 
payments indicated an income elasticity of 1.5 for a proportional rate 
structure and 1.7 for a progressive rate structure, 
• Another criterion for judging the merit of the four systems are a 
comparison of the burden of the state income tax by income group. 
In Table h-h, the income tax burden for income groups above $3,000 
-iras estimated. These results indicate that the present system is the 
least progressive, followed by the present system vjithout federal tax 
deductibility, a state income tax vjith a proportional rate on federal 
income tax payments, and a state income tax with progressive rate applied 
to federal tax payments. 
ïabD.o 11,11, The biirden of the lov.'a income tax by income group under four different income tax systems 
iCncome tax based on the 
federal income tax Present income tax system 
I^roportioïial Progressive Federal Income Federal Income 
Rate Rate Tax Deductible Tax Not Deductible 
3.000- b,ooo 0,90 o,h^ o.h^ 0.67 
h,ooi- ^,000 1.00 0.60 o.7k 1.03 
^,001- 6,000 1.09 0.7b 1.02 l.ho 
• 6,001- 7,000 1.15 0.86 1.26 I.6I4 
7.001- 8,000 1.20 0.96 l,h3 1.83 
8,001- 9,000 1.27 1.09 1.56 1.95 
9,001- 10,000 1.33 1.22 1.69 2.23 
10,001- 15,000 1.52 1.57 2.06 2,70 
15,001- 20,000 1.85 2.22 2.52 3.25 
20,001- 25,000 2.114 2.01 2.82 3.65 
25,001- 30,000 2.39 3.29 2.91 3.87 
30,001- 35,000 2.66 3.78 2.97 h.l2 
35,001- ko,000 2.88 It.17 3.02 li.32 
1(0,001- [|5,000 3.11 lt.55 3.02 L.37 
1,5,001- 50,000 3.36 li.97 2.99 u.lt6 
50,001- 75,000 3.86 5.79 2.97 1.58 
75,001-100,000 J4.60 7.00 2.83 k.6i 
100,001-150,000 5.33 8.17 2.90 2I.S2 
150,000 and over 6.65 10.27 2.9U h,76 
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state corporate income tax 
This is probably one of the most difficult state tax sources to 
analyse, due to the lack of data and the general way this source is taxed. 
Tables U.5 and were constructed from corporate tax records for 
the income year I967. They should provide some insight into the general 
structure of Iowa corporations. Corporations were classified into the 
different business classes that roughly follow the Standard Industrial 
Classification Codes (62). The category classified as miscellaneous is 
C0iiç)0sed primarily of real estate rental corporations that are most 
numerous in the in-state corporation category. 
Of the total of 8,970 corporations that filed a state corporate tax 
return over the period, 6,939, or 77 percent, are fully vjithin Io>ja, i.e,, 
all their sales were within the state. However, this does not represent 
all of the corporations within the state of Iowa. Those corporations 
that show no state corporate tax liabilities are not processed and no 
records of these firms are kept. Of the total net taxable corporate 
income reported, k9 percent is for corporations fully within lovja, indi­
cating that the ii>-state corporations are relatively small establishments, 
mostly retailers, utilities, and service industries. 
For the corporations not fully i-jithin Iowa, utilities, manufacturers 
and retailers pay the largest amount of state corporate taxes. The ratio 
of sales in Iowa to sales elsewhere for multi-state corporations amount to 
an average of 0,92 percent. This figure does not reflect the taxable 
income of the corporations in Iowa, but rather, the total income of the 
corporation inside Iowa as well as elsewhere. 
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Table Taxable income for Iowa corporations and multi-state 
corporations classified by business class for 196? ($000) 
Net Taxable Income 
Business Class 
lovia Corporations Multi-state Corporations 
Contractors 12,62h.k 5,989.0 
Farmers 1,920.8 55.2 
Finance 6,51tO.S 885.0 
Manui'acturing 21;, 295.0 I7,286.b 
Natural resources 1,316.6 1,829.2 
Newspapers 1,829.2 3,860.7 
Utilities 27,338.2 59,021.3 
Retailors 38,663.3 21,197.3 
Services 20,371.2 5,UU3.3 
Transport 3,619.0 2,678.6 
Fnolesalers 13,690.8 111,283.9 
•"miscellaneous 6,709.2 1,227.9 
Unclassified h2.2 h6.h 
TOTiiX 150,050.3 163,801.2 
Table It.6. Distribution of taxable income of lovra corporations and inu3.ti-statc corporations for 
1967 ($000) 
Business Class 
Iowa Corporations 
Taxable Income Brackets 
Below 
$2^,000 
$25,001-
$100,000 
Over 
$100,001 
Multi-state Corporations 
Taxable Income Brackets 
Below 
$2^,000 
$25,001-
$100,000 
Over 
$100,001 
Contractors 
Farmers 
finance 
Manufacturing 
Natural resources 
Newspapers 
Utilities 
Retailors 
Services 
Transport 
Wholesalers 
Miscellaneous 
Unclassified 
TOTAL 
Tax paid 
3,932.9 
1,311.3 
2.893.7 
2.813.8 
157.3 
179.9 
1,056.0 
15,676.2 
8,983.0 
1,110.3 
3,306.8 
1,305.7 
I12.2 
45,769.1 
1,829.7 
k,728.0 
173.3 
2,^78.2 
Il,hl|0.2 
b35.8 
2k6,8 
l,3k3.2 
10,669.k 
6,2li9.3 
1,500,6 
1,025,1 
1,919.9 
38,509.8 
1,860.0 
3.963.5 
166,2 
1.168.6 
17,010.9 
753.k 
l,il02.5 
2k,938.9 
12,317.7 
5,138.9 
1,038,1 
6,358.8 
1*83.5 
7b,615.0 
L,753.2 
1.289.1 
55,2 
103.1 
3, hid, h 
94.6 
L,2 
25.5 
1.835.2 
800.6 
h86.5 
l,7li7.2 
250.9 
h6,h 
10,179.9 
1407.2 
1,398.3 
781.9 
7,863.9 
179,5 
85.2 
3ÏÎ.7 
2,835.9 
1,323,3 
9hh. 8 
3,65h,3 
355,5 
19,l]li.?.l) 
977,3 
3,311.6 
35.981.0 
1,555.1 
3,771,3 
58.961.1 
16.526.2 
3,319,3 
l,2li7,3 
8,882,k 
621. li 
13)4,176.8 
10,11(6.6 
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The distribution of the net taxable income is shoim. in Table U.6, Of 
the total number of corporations "within Iowa, 29 percent have taxable 
income below $2$,000; 2h percent between $2^,001 and $100,000; and U7 per­
cent above $100,001. For corporations not f-ully within Iowa the corres­
ponding distributions were 6 percent, 12 percent, and 82 percent. 
State corporate tax responsiveness 
Notwithstanding the relative detail available for the 196? calendar 
year, no con^arable data exist for prior years. In order to evaluate 
this revenue source one must rely on aggregate data. The determination 
of the revenue productivity of the Iowa corporate income tax is difficult. 
El-en at the national level, where the tax base is well defined, corporate 
profit behavior seems to be less well understood. 
In any study of yields the following relationships should be 
considered: • 
(1) the interrelationship betifeen Iowa corporate tax liabilities and 
the federal corporate tax liabilities, which is due to the fact that 50 
percent of federal corporate tax liabilities are deductible on the Iowa 
returns 
(2) rate changes 
(3) the effect of the progressiveness in the rate structure introduced 
in 1967 
(ii) the relationship beti^een Iowa corporate profits and national 
corporate profit 
(5) the definition of the Iowa tax base itself, under which corpo­
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rations operating in loï^a allocate their income on the basis of the 
percentage of total sales that take place in Iowa. 
Relationship (l), (2), and (3) can be solved reasonably well thro-ugh 
the adjustment of appropriable net taxable income of corporations. 
The adjustjnent for the base changes, i.e., the 100 percent and 50 
percent deduction for federal corporation income tax paid and the adjust­
ments necessary for the various changes the federal corporation income 
tax was made as follows: 
CEBT, 
GTCI. = ÎÎTCL. X 
CPAT^ 
The rate change adjustment at the state level was done as follows: 
ICT+ UTCIj. 
^t 
where 
GTCI^ = Gross tazcable corporate income at titne t 
ETCI. = Net taxable corporate income 
GIBT^ = Corporate taxable income before tax 
CIA.T^ = Corporate income after tax 
V 
ICT^ = Iowa corporate income tax 
r^ = Iowa corporation tax rate 
These adjustments to the Iowa taxable corporate income, allowed the 
study of this tax source in the absence of exogenous tax base and rate 
changes at the national, as well as on the state level. 
The effect of the progressiveness of the Iowa corporate tax structure 
since 196? can be estimated by means of a similar procedure to that used 
for the state income tax (lt5) ' 
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Log ICT = -1.9393 + 1.1375 Log"^'ïïTCI 
( .1562) 
= .9878 
Equation (2i.35) indicates that the rate elasticity of state corporate 
taxes tjith respect to taxable corporate income is 1.1375 under the new 
state corporate ta:< rate structure. 
This leaves conditions (ii) and (5) to be resolved. The relationship 
botrt'een national corporate noveaients and that for lovia can be studied 
through an analysis of the different types of corporations and their 
relative profitability weighted by Iowa's share in these industries. The 
zeaningflûness of this procedure is limited because of the specification 
of the tax base. As an alternative it >ras decided to use the movements 
in the national profits as an exogenous explanatory variable for movements 
in the Iowa corporate profits. 
It was decided to use the ratio of loiva personal income to national 
personal income as a proxy variable for the proportion of sales that can 
be contributed to Iowa. This was done because of a lack of a consistant 
series relating total sales in Iowa to national sales. 
The folloifling regression equation was estimated: 
NTCI (10°) = -9li.l327 + 5.966lftlO^) NI + 
(79.1997) (0.3713) 
= .9521 
D.W. = 1.217 
where 
ÎITCI = Net taxable corporate income in Iowa 
NI = National taxable corporate income 
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lY = Total Iowa personal income 
JIY = Total U. S, personal income 
Equation (li.36) indicates that an increase of $1 billion in corporate 
profits lead to an increase in. Iowa taxable corporate profit of $5.9 
million and a -unit increase in Iowa*s share of national income will 
increase Iowa's taxable corporate income by $82.2 million. Barring a 
substantial increase in Iowa's share in the national economic activity, 
the corporate income base seems rather unresponsive. 
The property tax 
In the analysis of the growth aspects of the property tax it is 
generally found that over periods of 10 to 15 years in which cyclical 
movements are minor, the market value of taxable property does rise 
roughly as fast as state personal income, and during such periods assess­
ment ratios probably would not fall appreciably. This indicates an income 
elasticity of the property tax base of 1.0. The income elasticity coef­
ficient of property tax base, hoi-xever, depends on both the length and the 
nature of the time period under consideration, and the specific coverage 
of the actual taxes being discussed (7). 
The coverage of the property tax is relevant to elasticity estiinates, 
because a property tax confined to realty is likely to have a substantially 
lower elasticity coefficient than one which includes large amounts of 
personalty. The fundamental issue in the property tax/income elasticity 
argument depends on the policy concern. If the principle interest is in 
the behavior of property taxes over periods of large cyclical fluctuations 
in income, the short-term variability of the revenue is the proper focus 
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of conccrn, and changes in assessed values of taxable property may be the 
proper variable, i.e., assessment ratios are likely to rise in recessions 
and fall in subsequent upturns. This is desirable in terms of stability, 
but undesirable in terms of revenue. 
If the concern is "with a period of mild cycles, the short-term 
stability of the revenue is not much of a concern, because assessment 
ratios are not likely to vary significantly. The proper variable is 
likely to be the responsiveness of revenue to economic growth as reflected 
in the trend of the market value of taxable property. Both assessed value 
and market value elasticities are estimated here. 
Because of the specific characteristics of the property tax, a 
property tax model might be formulated as follows: 
PT = r(aB) (i;.37) 
where 
PT = Property tax revenue 
r = Tazc rate 
a = Assessment ratio 
B = Property tax base (market value) 
The amount of property taxes collected is therefore a function of three 
variables, namely, the tax rate, market value of taxable property and the 
assessment ratios. It is possible to have increasing property tax revenue 
i-iith a declining ratio of assessed value to market value. This is possible 
if the declining assessment ratio is more than offset by rising property 
ta:c rates. In this section, movements in the tax base are discussed 
independently of assessed value and vice versa. 
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The behavior of property taxes over time for the different components 
of the property tax base can be defined as: 
PTit - r^(l + X ). Cli.38) 
vhere 
(1 + X = Growth in the tax base 
i = 1——5^ corresponding to real residential property, 
farm realty, public utility realty, commercial and 
industrial realty, and personal property 
The grotrt-h in the different components of the tax base can then be 
described as a function of state personal income; 
(1 + A Bit - (k.39) 
where 
Y = State personal income 
The usual functional form assumed is: 
(1 + X = a]f (I;.1-0) 
v/here a is a constant and B is a constant, indicating the income elas­
ticity of the various components of the tax base. 
The hypothesis that the gro"wth of the property tax base can be 
expressed solely in terms of the movement in. state personal income, 
abstracts from a host of factors influencing the value of real estate 
such as the rate of new construction of real property. However, for 
purposes of determining the income elasticity of the tax base, it is 
assumed that state personal income is an aggregative index of the factors 
influencing the gro:fth in the property tax base. 
If the average property rates are kept constant at the grovrbh 
in property tax levies can be determined. The availability of poteniâ.al 
Ih 
revenue for future local expenditure can thus be estimated. The deter-
3:nination of property tax levies is, however, not estimated in this rigid 
1-ny. Local authorities continually change the average rate of taxation 
on taxable property. Usually property tax levies are a residual. That is 
to say, the revenue needs for various local expenditure programs are first 
determined. Erom this amount, revenue from exogenous sources, such as 
state and federal aid and revenue from fees and miscellaneous charges are 
subtracted, leaving the residual to be made up by property taxes. 
This process indicates a direct interrelationship between local 
public expenditure and local public revenues. Estimates of expenditures 
at the local level are therefore needed. 
Public expenditure projections require an analysis of: 
(1) the demand for public services 
(2) the quality of public services 
(3) the relationship between public and private sectors in meeting 
specific kinds of demand for services 
Numerous studies have been made to determine which factors influence 
public expenditures at the state and local level (3). These studies 
usually use cross-sectional data, because of the great amount of detail 
available in these surveys, thus allowing the use of numerous explanatory 
variables. The purpose is usually to determine why there is a variation 
in public expenditures among states or localities. For purposes of fore­
casting public expenditures the coefficients derived from cross-sectional 
data become questionable (37). In the case of time series analysis, the 
familiar problem of data limitations forces the analyst to a very limited 
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nmnbcr of erqslanatory variables. Another alternative i-rould be to use an 
oxiLGtinf: study of local expenditures, but no such study covering only 
local expenditures exists. 
This leaves one i-âth a very aggregative model to determine the 
e:{penditure-property tax relationship, A model similar to that used by 
Henderson (l6) was therefore iitç)leraented. 
The revenue sources available to local governments can be put into 
four major categories: 
(1) federal grants 
(2) state aid 
(3) oiim sources including tax revenues and other miscellaneous 
revenue 
(L) creation of new local debt 
The effects of exogenous factors such as state and federal aid to 
local government on property tax levies must therefore be determined before 
the tax levies can be determined. 
The property tax function could be written as; 
PTt = - R^) ik.la) 
where 
?T = Per • capita local property revenue 
G = Local government expenditures 
R = Inter-governmental revenue 
b = Some fixed coefficient 
ÎTew per capita debt can then be described as the difference between local 
expenditure and local taxes plus government transfers. This assumes a 
balancing of total local expenditures and total local revenue. 
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In terms of the model, this relationship can be defined as: 
Dt = Gt- Pft - ^  
= 1 - b(G^ - R^) (h.h2) 
v/hcrc 
= Kew per capita debt creation 
This leaves the independent variable (G^), local governmental expenditures, 
to be determined. The following functional relationship might be applied: 
Dt - Ky Pt' Pt) C'-k)) 
where 
= Local government s;<peridlturcs at time t 
= Intergovernmental revenue 
= Population 
p^ = Prices of goods demanded by local governments 
= State personal income 
Per capita income is assumed to be a prime determinant of the demand 
for public as t:ell as for private goods. An individual's choice among 
alternative goods, public or private, Td.ll in general depend on his income 
and to the extent that local government respond to the t-dshes of the 
community, expenditure on public goods might be expected to depend on the 
coxrsTûnityîs income. 
Intergovernmental transfers are exogenous and should play an isçjortant 
role in the determination of the level of local governmental expenditure. 
Intergovernmental revenue is, of course, not completely exogenous under a 
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matching arranEcment, but the aid received by local governments is usually 
not of-this IcLnd. 
In addition to affecting the demand for public goods, the cost of 
public goods i^ill be determined by the level of income. A major cost of 
providing public goods is labor cost, which generally rises or falls "with 
individual income. Hence income may lead to changes in public spending 
even if the demand for public goods is unaffected by the income changes. 
It was therefore decided to exclude the price of goods and services 
bought by local governments as an independent variable. Population was 
included because as the need for public goods expands vâth population 
increases, it id.!! be necessary to add to the stock of public capital. 
The income elasticity of the property tax base 
The determination of the market values of taxable property is a 
formidable problem haitipered by the lack of reliable data,^ The basic 
sources used were the annual assessment sales ratio study by the lovia 
Department of Revenue (33) available since 1^61 and the Census of Govern­
ments available for 1^56, 1961, and 1966 (59, 60, 6l). To calculate the 
market values of taxable property the size-weighted, average assessment 
sales ratios were used. 
For residential property annual sales were of substantial magnitude 
and a reasonably accurate determination of annual market values could be 
calculated for the period 1961 to 1967. Since the assessment sales ratio 
from the 1956 Census of Governments did not seem out of Une, that year 
was also included in the series. 
^?or a discussion of the problems involved in estimating the market 
value of taxable property see Kushkin (U7). 
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The market value of farm realty was determined from IT. S. D. A. 
sources, since these estimates were "based on the agricultural value of 
land, which seems to reflect a better picture of the market value of farm 
land as used for agricultural purposes. Inflated farmland prices are 
often found in cases where farmland is bought for residential purposes, 
public purposes such as recreation, or to be held or acquired for future 
development purposes. Another factor causing inflated farmland prices 
is the fact that i-d.th continual increases in farm sizes, due to economics 
of scale, a farmer might be t-Jilling to pay a higher price for an adjacent 
farm than for more distant farms. An annual series of the agricultural 
market value of land was used for the period 19S6 to ISSl, 
No atteinpt was made to estimate the market value of public utility 
properties, mainly because of the assessment practices of public utilities 
in loi-za. "I-Iarket value" here is considered to be the original cost of 
the construction of such a plant and aiy new additions which are also 
considered at the cost price, Ko provision is made for depreciation on 
the assumption that the depreciation is cancelled by the natural 
appreciation of property values. 
This definition of "market value" is used after adjusting for the 
changes in the assessment ratios for public utility property. Before 
1959 the assessment cost ratio was US percent; between I960 and 196? it 
T-.'as 35 percent; and in 1968 it vjas decreased to 27 percent of cost-. 
Reasonable estimates of the market value of residential realty and 
farm realty were possible, as well as in the case of public utility 
property where the appropriate tax base is the original construction cost. 
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However, when commercial and industrial realty are considered the factual 
basis of the estimation of market value becomes questionable. 
No great reliance c^ be placed on the.reported assessment-sales 
ratios because of the small volume of sales of such property within a 
given year. The resultant assessment-sales ratios show large unexplain-
able variations between years, and market values based on the Census of 
Governments data for 19^6, 1961, and 1966 vary greatly. 
Because of this problem it i^as decided to use the benchmark market 
value estimate made by Mushkin (U7) for commercial and industrial property 
in IoT-:a for 1961. The market value of commercial and industrial property 
for 19$6 "i-jas obtained by a weighted average sales ratio for 1965, 1966, 
and 1967, thereby covering a larger sample that resulted in a more 
reliable estimate of market value. 
The same problem was encountered in estimating the market value of 
personal property, With no data available on the state level for items 
like farm machinery, business inventories, and taxable residential 
personal property, it was decided to subdivide personal property into 
three categoriesj namely, residential personal property, farm personal 
property and commercial and industrial personal property. It was further 
assumed that the assessment-sales ratios for these types of property were 
the same as that for realty. The estimated market value for the different 
types of real and personal property are presented in Table h.7 for I96I 
and 1966. 
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Laûlc U.7. î-'iarkct value of lovia tsn.gi.ble taxable property for 1561 
and 1966 ($000,000) 
TYPE 
l'IABJCET VALUE5 
1961 1966 
Fam reslty 8,186 10,533 
Residential realty 5^508 7^031; 
Co.Tiniercial and Industrial realty 2,031: . 2,629 
Public utilities l,33h 1,685 
Personal property 2,915 3,1:89 
TOTAL 19,977 25,370 
The net property tax revenues for the corresponding years Here $375.5 
rdllion and $h95.6 rrôllion, respectively. This corresponds to a property 
tax rate of 0,0188 for 1961 and 0.0195 for 1966, or an average annual 
increase in rates of .OOOlL. For 1967 and 1968 the absolute airiount of 
property tax levied decreased sli^tly due to the property tax relief 
measures. Only half of the benefits associated i-o-th these changes were 
realized in 1967, while the full effect vxas realized in 1968. The average 
effective tax rate for 1968 was calculated by projecting the market value 
of taxable property to 1968 by the follovjing simple procedure: 
= AW. ^ 1  
(Yt * 1 - y 
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Khcre 
MV = Market value of the appropriate tax base 
e = Income elasticity coefficient of the specific tax base 
1 - Total personal income 
The projected market value of taxable property for 1968 ivas $2Ôy99h 
million and the actual property taxes levied in 1968 payable in 1969, 
$585 million. The average effective tax rate therefore decreased to 
.01757, which is substantially lower than the corresponding rate for 
1966. 
The estimated market value elasticity coefficients for the different 
types of taxable property are given in Table It.8, • These elasticities are 
based on 1956-1967 time period for residential realty, agricultural land, 
and public utilities, while it is based on the period 1961-1966 for 
personal property and industrial and commercial realty. 
Table ii.8. Income elasticity of the market value of the different types 
of taxable property. 
Income. iype ELas-picity 
Farm realty 0,6583 
Public utilities 0.81:28 
Residential realty 0.81:03 
Commercial and Industrial realty O.6878 
Personal property 0,1;809 
TOTAL 0.6993 
The ineone elasticity of the market value of taxable property in 
loKa is appro:cimately 0.7 iviith the most elastic sources being residential 
realty and public utilities and personal property being the least elastic. 
In assessing the potential beha'v'ior of the property taxes over the 
medium term in the absence of sharp cyclical fluctuations the income 
elasticity of market value seems to be the most appropriate. If the 
short-term behavior of the property tax base is desired, the assessed 
value might be more appropriate. Assessments, however, have been and 
still are subject to numerous criticisms o^-iing to inequities in assessment 
practices including the assessment of different classes of property at 
different assessment ratios (ii3). In recent years the state has tried to 
impose more equitable assessment practices, but these reforms have met 
TJith considerable opposition, especially from the owners of farm realty. 
At this time it seems uncertain whether geographic inequalities can be 
eliminated, and whether the movements to assess farmland at 27 percent of 
market value is going to meet with any success. 
The assessed value of the different types of property is indicated in 
Table L,9. 
The overall lag of assessed value behind market value is 9.9 percent 
as shoivn in Table It.9, Only in the case of residential property has the 
assessed value kept pace with the growth in market value. In fact, the 
increase in assessed value was 5,1 percent higher than the market value, 
indicating that the assessed value as a percentage of market value 
increased slightly over the period considered. In the case of farm realty 
the assessment lag was quite pronounced. The income elasticity of assessed 
value, as shown in Table iiJ.0, underscores these lag patterns. 
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Table It.9. The assessed value of different types of taxable 
for 1961 and 1966 
property-
Type of Property-
Assessed Value 
1961 1966 
lag of assessed 
value behind 
market value 
Farm realty 2061.7 2268.1 18.7 
l^iblic utilities 580.5 703.5 5.1 
Mercantile and Industrial realty ôlLul; 760.0 5.9 
Residential property 12h5.1 165a.7 -5.1 
Personal property 163.h 836.7 10.1 
TOTAL 5265.1 6222.5 9.9 
Table 1;.10. xncome elasticity of assessed value of the different types 
of taxable property 
Type of Property Income 
Elasticity 
Farm realty .2172 
Public utilities .69IU; 
Residential realty .89^6 
Co]3aercial and Industrial realty .7823 
Personal property .3099 
TOTAL .5136 
ou 
Probably the most interesting component of the assessed value, income 
elasticity is the e^ctrercely low value found for fam realty. 
Local g:ovcrnmcnt e^gaenditures 
Local government expenditure was estimated by the follotajig equa­
tions : 
G, = -^o.9Gsf% o.isef'T. , + 0.5305 R+ (U.UU) 
" (29.9096) ( .03166)^ " ^ ( .8021;) 
= .957U 
PT, = .968F'TÊ - Ht - 1%) (U.U5) 
^ (.01359) 
r2 = .9991 
where 
= Total per capita general expenditures 
" Per capita state personal income 
= State and federal aid to local governments 
PT^ = Net property tax per capita 
= I'Hscellaneous revenue (fees, etc.) 
t = 1956-57 to 1967-68 
All coefficients, except the coefficient for R^, were significant. 
One -i-:o-ald expect that the level of state aid would have some influence on 
local expenditure levels. The lack of significance can be attributed to 
the fact that state aid to local governments was historically not very 
responsive to the growth in local expenditure programs. The major reason, 
however, is the high degree of intercorrelation that existed between state 
8^ 
personal iriconc and state aid to local governments. If forecasting is 
the priirory objective, then the intercorrelation of explanatory variables 
may not be too serious, provided that it may be expected to continue in 
the future. 
A similar model, based on cross-sectional data, applied to the 
different counties in Iowa might yield different results, but this was 
not done because of lack of personal income data on a county basis. As 
an alternative the same relationships were estimated for local goverrt-
ments in the U. S. for 1966-67. Equation (li.ii6) indicates the coefficients 
estimated when all the states in the S. were included. Equation (U.ii?) 
i-inas estimated for 2li states that had characteristics similar to Iowa, 
such as the size of the local budget with respect to the total state-local 
budget, the percentage of all local revenue collected from own sources, 
and the percentage of local revenue collected through property taxes, 
= -62.33lf% . + 1.087^1 (i;.li6) 
(26.27a) ( .01038) ( .1^78) 
= .8868 
C-- = -3.82U7 -i- 0.0$8S#% T 4- 1.3555\ (it.l7) 
(5.$68a) ( .02021) ( .285^) " 
= .8075 
wnere 
G, = Per capita local expenditure for 1966-67 for all states 
• in the U. S. 
G^j_ = Per capita local expenditure for 1966-67 for states viith 
characteristics similar to Iowa 
The correlation betvxeen R. and Y, _ was small and in both cases the 
X. x-1 
regression coefficients for were significant. 
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or specific rclcvance is the macnit-ude of the regression coefficient 
associated iJith Depending on the size of the regression coefficient, 
state aid to local £Ovemm.cnts can be categorized as stimulating, neutral 
or destinulating. 
c3 
——1 = 0 —state aid is a substitute for revenue 
O collected at the local level, and an increase 
in state aid to local governments will there­
fore be an effective mechanism to relieve 
the local tax burden 
dG, 
° O < ^ < 1 —state aid is a partial substitute for revenue 
Ô collected at the local level in the sense 
that a unit increase in state aid "will lead 
to less than a unit increase in local 
expenditure 
t 
= 1 —an increase in state aid "Hill lead to a 
corresponding increase in local expenditure 
= > 1 —an increase in state aid x-JilO. stiimlate local 
expenditure more than proportionally 
In both equation and (It.1:7) the regression coefficient is 
greater than 1, but not statistically different from 1, This leads to the 
conclusion, based on the cross-sectional estimates, that an increase in 
state aid to local governments vjill lead to a proportional increase in 
local expenditure. 
The use of coefficients estimated on a cross-sectional basis for 
projection purposes seems subject to question (37). It liras therefore 
decided to re-estimate equation (U.hS) leaving the independent variable 
out. 
G. = -99.252/+ ,1532% - (U.U8) (21.6151) (.01073) 
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= .9622 
D.H. =1.29 
PT, « .96lf*''t£. - lU - ML.) 
 ^ (.0117) 
= .9986 
D.U. = 1.10 
The income elasticity of local expenditiires based on current dollars 
is indicated beloif. 
Table it.11. Income elasticity of local eicpenditures 
Year Income Elasticity 
1967-68 1.1:112 
1966-6? 1.1319 
1965-66 1.3163 
I96I1-6S 1.1302 
19ô3-6k 1.2:192 
1962-63 i.a58 
1961-62 1.10.05 
1960-61 i.m5 
1^59-60 1.5661: 
1.6016 
1957-58 1.611:6 
1956-57 1.6257 
The incorr^e elasticity of local government expenditure is substantially 
higher than the elasticity of the local tax base, namely, l.U against 0.7, 
indicating clearly that the level of local expenditure vjill depend to a 
large extent on the community's vâUingness to absorb hi^er local property 
tax: rates, in the absence of a responsive state-aid program or federal aid 
to local government. 
88 
A oisTilar regression, equation was estimated in constant dollars to 
determine the rcsponsivenccs of local expenditure in real terms, 
G, = -23.3012 + 0.1073""*-Tx -, (1;.50) 
^ (33'.67U) ( .0178) 
= .8183 
D.l'J. - 1.25 
PT,. = 0.9532"'"(i - Rx - m.) (it.5l) 
" ( .01168) * " * 
=• .9986 
D.y. = 1.12 
where G, was deflated by the national price index for state and local 
e>:penditures and by the constmer price index. 
The constant dollar income elasticity of local expenditure is shown 
in Table li.l2. 
Table U.12. Income elasticity of local government expenditure 
Year Income Elasticity 
1967-68 1.1370 
1966-67 1.1L36 
1965-66 1.0902 
1961^-65 1.1329 
1963-6It 1.1105 
1962-63 1.1113 
1961-62 1.0610. 
1960-61 1.0629 
1959-60 I.iii52 , 
1958-59 1.2277 
1957-53 1.1798 
1956-57 1.1266 
The incone elasticity of local ezpenditizre in real terms is approxi-
natelj'- 1.0 indicating that local expendittires in the aggregate just kept 
pace 1-jith the increase in the economic weH-being of the comm-onity. As 
indicated previously, the income elasticity of local ezpendit"ures, in 
current terms, is substantially greater than 1, indicating that prices 
of goods and services used by local governments increased more than the 
prices of all consumer goods and services combined. 
Consumption taxes 
A consumption tax is usually defined in either percentage terms 
(ad valorem) or in terms of units of output (unit tax). The amount of 
consunration taxes collected are therefore dependent on both the physical 
quantity consumed and the price of the specific commodity. If all prices 
are clianging precisely in the same "way, ad valorem taxes in 11 change 
proportionally in money terms, but remain constant in real terms. If 
prices are permitted to change diversely, it is possible for consumption 
taxes on some commodities to change in real terms. A unit tax on the 
other hand does not change, even in money terms, t-iith changes in the price 
level. As prices change, quantities remaining constant, the money burden 
of the tax stays the same and the real tax moves in the opposite direction 
from the price change. VJhether quantities of specific commodities (or 
groups) remain constant or not depend on the price elasticity and income 
elasticity of demand of taxed commodities. 
This sort of partial approach is contrasted mth the aggregate 
approach t-rhich is generally found in consu^iption function estimation 
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procccku-es (l). The consumption function in its simplest form is "based 
on the assumption that real consumer expenditures are a stable function 
of real income. 
Since real consumption is a function of real income, the absolute 
level of consumer prices is of no consequence, except for the indirect 
effects» These indirect effects such as interest rates, expectations, 
and real value of consumer money balances are ignored here. 
Such a formulation does not take into account the effects on aggre­
gate consumer demand, of changes in the relative prices of different 
consumer goods implying that these effects do not exist or that the 
relative prices are a stable function of the level of real income. 
In its sinplest form such a relative price effect might be incorpo­
rated in an empirical implementation as follows: 
or / Y \ 
= a + b I + c 
\CPI/. 
i-zhere 
CT^ = Consumption tax on the i"^ commodity group 
Pj_ = Price of the i^^ commodity group 
CPI = Consumer price index 
1 = Income 
Such a hypothesis txas tested for the three broadly defined consuirotion 
groups, namely food, durable goods, and non-durable goods, but the relation­
ships were found to be insignificant. 
In addition to the above mentioned considerations the type of growth 
that the state experiences should also be considered. In the case of a 
per capita income increase, the marginal propensity to consume and there­
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fore consimer outlay are more likely to change. In the case where an 
income increase is met with a corresponding increase in population, leaving 
per capita income unchanged, the average propensity to consume of the popu­
lation and the composition of the market basket are less likely to change. 
Since IOTO is experiencing a substantial per capita increase in 
income, it i-xas decided that the relevant income variable should be per 
capita personal income. 
Time series estimates of the consumption tax relationships were 
applied. The estimation of the responsiveness of the consunption taxes 
relied on a modified consun^tion fimction approach. Starting I'Jith the i-reH 
established proposition that consumption is dependent on aggregate real 
income, the foUoi-iing qualifications were introduced: 
(1) Income was adjusted for taxes by the use of disposable income. 
The estimation of disposable income on the state level consisted of 
personal income minus direct taxes. Direct tax deductions in this case 
were federal and state income tax, sales and use tax paid by consumers, 
residenticG. property taxes, insurance premium tax, beer tax, cigarette 
tax and that portion of motor vehicle fuel tax paid directly by consumers. 
(2) Disposable income was deflated by the consumer price index. The 
consumption tax categories were deflated by the relevant price indexes in 
the case where the sales and use tax responsiveness was estimated in real 
terms. 
(3) A six month lag in consumption behavior was allowed for. 
(!•) All the variables are in per capita terms to take the population 
growth effect into account. 
(5) Changes were made in the tax base over the period considered. 
In the case of sales and use taxes the major adjustments were made for the 
introduction of a tax on hotel services and the introduction of a sales 
tax on beer and cigarettes sold at retail, 
(6) An explicit rate variable is included to account for the effect 
of rate changes over the time period concerned, rather than to adjust the 
raw data for the effect of rate changes (66). This was done because 
there is reason to believe that in the case of a consmjgjtion tax the rate 
effect might not be proportional to the rate change. 
Retail sales and use tax 
The sales and use tax changed from 2 percent to 3 percent. The 
responsiveness of the sales and use tax of such a proportional rate change 
would be unaffected if the rate elasticity of retail sales and use tax is 
equal to 1. Tax rates are included in the estimation of the responsiveness 
of the sales and use tax in a latter section and such a hypothesis vjiH be 
tested in that section. 
The major base change enacted in 196? i-zas the tax cn selected 
services. Two major categories under this provision, the sales tax on 
advertising and new construction, were highly controversial and were 
repealed as of July 1, 1969. Data does not exist for a sufficient time 
period to evaluate the responsiveness of the tax base of these services. 
The oiùy data available on the consumption of services in Iowa are those 
published by the "Census of Business: Selected Services, Iowa" for the 
years 1958 and 1963 (57, 58). Since these reported services follow the 
service tax base rather closely it was decided to use these data for the 
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estimation of the income elasticity of the service tax base. The base 
elasticity xras estimated at 1.6695^ which is quite elastic and would 
account for a more elastic sales tax. The increase in the elasticity of 
the sales tax due to this source depends on its magnitude, which is 
difficult to determine, A breakdown of the revenue from this source is 
available for the quarters April to June 1968 and July to September 1968, 
Estimates were made of the amount of service tax collected in the quarters 
October to December 196? and January to March 1968, The collections for 
these four quarters were considered as a reasonable approximation for the 
sales tax that would be collected over the regular fiscal year. It was 
estimated that the sales tax collections for the fiscal year 1967-1968 
would have been $lU,5 million. 
This indicates a relatively small effect on the elasticity of the 
sales tax because of the small magnitude involved. The influence of the 
service tax on the elasticity of the sales tax will be discussed in a 
latter section. 
The second a^ect in the tax base change is the repeal of the "not 
readily obtainable clause" in the case of the use tax, A direct estimate 
of this effect does not seem feasible. It i-xas therefore decided to test 
the effect of these base changes by testing whether there is any shift in 
the intercept term by introducing a duininy variable for the years when the 
change became effective. 
The foUovông equation was fitted: 
UT^ = -1,5762'"'+ 0,00L$6f% - 0,3033 D.o (1,53) 
" (2.626U) (O.OOOlil95)^ (1,9688) 
= ,9872 
9k 
v;herc 
UT_^ = Use tax in year t 
= Total state personal income 
Dxo = Duznmy variable to test whether there is a significant 
difference between tax collections for 1958 and previous 
years 
Equation (U.53) indicates that the effect of the "not readily obtainable 
clause" as indicated by the dummy variable is insignificant. No f-urther 
analysis of these aspects was possible because at the moment no specific 
data are available other than the total use tax collections for the fiscal 
year 1968-69. The Iowa Department of Revenue speculates that the reason 
for the insignificant effect might be found in à lack of con^liance by 
the various firms that would fall under this provision. Other possible 
explanations might be a substitution of purchases from ou'b-of-state firms 
to in-state firms or to some extent a stockpiling of materials prior to 
the enactment of this law. 
Since the sales and use tax are basically similar, both were lumped 
togethero The retail sales and use tax cannot be considered as homogenous 
in the aggregate. Depending on the economic changes over time different 
components of the sales tax might behave differently. 
For this purpose the sales and use tax paid were divided into several 
homogenous subgroups as indicated in Table it.l3. 
95 
Table li.l3. The contribution of 
total sales and use 
the various coirponents 
tax in 1966-67 
to the state 
Type Amount ($000,000) Percentage 
Food 23.7 20.8 
Non-durable goods 33.6 29. Bh 
Durable goods 17.6 15.18 
Lumber and related goods 10.1 8.90 
Other 28.7 25.21 
TOTAL 113.7 100.00 
According to this classification, sales and use taxes are initially 
paid by consumers in the case of food, non-durable goods and durable goods. 
The business sector initially pays the category classified as other, while 
the grotç) indicated as lurriber and related materials cannot readily be 
separated into a proportion paid by consumers and business. 
Since the sales and use tax are not homogenous, the behavior of the 
different subgroups might be different in terms of the variables affecting 
the behavior of these groups. The consumption of different consumption 
groups can be considered as an interrelated set, but Klein and Fromm (H) 
in a comment on the Brookings model suggest that these interrelationships 
might be more apparent than real. 
In Table ii.lii the composition of the sales and use tax since 1951 is 
given, at four year intervals, for the five major components, vjith the 
composition in percentage terms indicated in parenthesis below each item. 
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Table iulU. Changes in the composition of the sales and use tax over time 
in current dollars ($000,000) 
Type 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 
Food 12.3 IL.I 17.8 19.7 23.7 
(19.7) (21.5) (22.7) (22.3) (20.9) 
Non-durable goods 20.3 20.6 2ii.3 27.6 33.6 
(32.6) (31.1;) (31.0) . (31.3) (29.6) 
Durable goods 10.3 10.3 11.3 12.8 17.5 
(16.5) (16.5) (]iu3) (11.5) (15.1) 
Liimber and materials 6.U 6.3 7.h 7.7 10.1 
(10.3) ( 9.6) ( 9.5) ( 8.7) ( 8.9) 
Other 13.0 • 13.8 17.6 20.U 28.7 
(20.8) (21.0) (22.5) (23.1) (25.3) 
TOTAL 62.3 65.6 78.3 88.2 113.6 
The noiH durable and durable consumption groups and the limber group 
shoif a slight do-wmvard movement, while the proportion of purchases by the 
business sector showed a slight increase and the food group remained 
relatively stable over the l6 year time span. 
The responsiveness of the sales and use tax and its different compo­
nents were estimated using per capita state disposable incozne and rate 
changes as independent variables. Since the regressions were fitted in 
logarithmic form, the coefficients also indicate the income elasticity. 
The Durban-Watson statistic, however, indicated auto-correlation and an 
adjustment in the data was necessary (36, p. 197). 
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Table ii.l5. Regressions estimated id-th times series data (1950-1968) f 
the sales and use tax and its components in current dollar 
Constant 
term 
Disposable 
income Rate D.W. R 
Sales and use -1.2117 0.8957^ 
(0.05719) 
1.0685^-
(0.05961) 
0.3161 2.1519 .9 
Sales tax. -1.2795 0.7737'"'''* 
(0.03707) 
1.0906'^ 
(0.05106) 
0.1250 1.9232 .9 
Use tax 
-2.7593 1.3971"''*"* 
(0.1U69) 
1.020S'"*"" 
(0.1521) 
0.3393 1.85U5 .9 
Food - .7li36 .8ii9r"-"-
( .06333) 
1.0898^ 
(0.107U) 
0.6813 1.7880 .9 
Non-durable 
consumption -1.1238 0.7^11'^' 
(0.0510;) 
1.0975^"' 
(0.05101) 
0.3661i 2.0571 .9 
Durable 
consumption -2.0686 1.0312-"-''-
(0.1189) 
1.0151'"* 
(0.1258) 
.3162 1.99m .9. 
Lumber and related 
materials 
-2.5297 
I
f
 o
 o
 
0.8815^::-
(0.06589) 
.1022 1.9689 .9. 
Other -2.0216 1.1377^'" 
(0.08651) 
1.056m 
(0.08161) 
.3691 2.3019 .9 
%'he sip^iificance levels of the corresponding variables are indicati 
by ("""'0 for a significance level of 0,01, and (^v for a significance lei 
of 0.05. This convention i^ill be followed in the tables throughout 
Chapter it. 
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The â.ncone elasticity of the sales and use tax in the aggregate 
was 0.65?57 mth use tax substantially more elastic than the sales tax 
component. The higher income elasticity of the use tax is not too 
surprising since it includes such items as motor vehicles, T'Jhen the 
income elasticity of the different coirçjonents of sales and use tax is 
estimated, the relatively low coefficients of determination (R2) indicate 
clearly the non-homogenous character of the sales and use tax described 
in the previous section. Especially in the case of durable consumption 
and lumber and materials one might conclude that there might, in addition 
to personal income, be other factors involved in determining the level 
of retail sales. For instance, in the case of lumber and materials sales, 
the building cycle might be far more important in determining the sales 
of this commodity group. For durable goods, factors such as availability 
of credit and existing stock of durable goods are among the factors that 
might be considered. These factors were not included because of the lack 
of data. 
As far as the rate elasticity is concerned, the coefficients indicate 
that there is little reason to believe that the rate effect is different 
from 1. Only in the case of lumber and related materials is the rate 
elasticity less than 1. 
In Table U.l6 the same relationships are estimated in real terms. 
All income variables were deflated by the consumer price index, while the 
different coirçionents of the sales and use tax base were deflated by the 
corresponding price index for that component. 
The income elasticity estimates, based on real terms, indicate a 
lower income elasticity for sales and use taxes combined as well as for 
Table i;.l6. Regressions estimated TO-th time series data (19^0-1968) for 
the sales and use tax and its components in constant dollars 
(1957-1959 » 100) 
Type 
Constant 
term 
Disposable 
income Rate D.W. 
Sales and use - .9767 0.8173'"-^ 
(0.08837) 
1.0677'"'"' 
(0.05721) .3561 
2.2228 .9799 
Sales tsjc 
- .7783 0.6391""'" (0.06209) 1.0866^--' (0.0U856) .2393 1.9729 .9826 
Use tax -2.1i59ii 1.^81:9**' 
(0.2722) 
l.OliSl*"'"' 
(0.1535) 
.1198 1.7786 .921L 
Food 
- .525it 0.7639'"'" 
( .1191;) 
1.1282''"'" 
( .1250) 
.7163 2.1720 .9096 
Non-d'arable 
consumption - .8136 0.6673*^ 
(0.09162) 
1.0908""'"* 
(0.0515U) 
.1:708 2.1507 .9788 
Durable 
consumption 
-3.2897 l.U;90^ 
(0.1673) 
1.0595^'"' (0.1291) .2521 1.9979 .91:22 
Lumber and related 
materials -3.61:97 0.920ii""'" 
(0.1826) 
1.0273'"'"' 
(0.2229) 
-.27hk 1.227 .7870 
Other 
-2.2992 1.1838 
(0.1217) 
0.9901^^' 
( .08371) 
.3086 2.3869 .9689 
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the conponcnts—food and non-dtirable goods. In the case of the use tax, 
durable consumption, lumber and materials, and other, the income elastic­
ities were higher than those estijnated in current terms. This indicates 
that the prices of these items increased relatively less than those for 
all consumer goods and services and that the consumption of these goods 
increased over time relative to personal income. 
Cigarette taxes 
The cigarette tax has been subject to numerous rate changes and, as 
described in chapter two, this tax has increased from a relatively 
insignificant revenue source to one of the larger tax sources. One of the 
reasons for this continual rate increase is the community's attitude 
towards cigarette consumption, which makes it a readily acceptable tax 
source. 
In terras of responsiveness, this tax source is less than ideal. 
The foUovông regression equation txas estimated: 
Log CGx = -1.6025 + .5153 Log Y+ .87IL Log r/" (1&.5W 
" ( .60U3) (.2022) P (.0963) 
= .9902 
D.¥. = 1.57 
where 
CG^ = Per capita cigarette consumption 
= Tax rates 
The income elasticity of .5153 for cigarette consumption is quite low, 
as can be expected, and the rate elasticity amounts to .873jLi indicating a 
response to cigarette tax rate increase that is less than proportional. 
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other taxes 
The income elasticities of the inheritance, insurance premitun, and 
fuel taxes are estimated in this section. All the variables are in log 
form and cover the period 1956-1968. 
Table 4.17. Least squares regressions vjith time-series data for 
inheritance tax, insurance premium tax, and motor vehicle 
fuel tax for 1956-1968 (current dollars) 
Tax a Y D.W. 
P 
IH " 1.1857** -.01^82 3.08 0.9671 
( .7h8L) ( .2251) (.03937) 
^IS 
IS l.W2l^ -.0L909 1.86 0.9816 
( .36Iiii) ( .1101) (.02179) 
FT - .805L** 0.1275** 1.0750** 2.39 0.9902 
( .088llt) ( .05163) (.1587) 
where 
IH = Inheritance tax per capita 
IS = Insurance premium tax per capita 
FT = Fuel tax per capita 
Rjg = Dummy variable representing base changes in the 
inheritance base 
R-_ = Dum^ variable representing base changes 1965-1968 
in insurance premium tax 
= Fuel tax rates 
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The behavior of the inheritance tax is somewhat erratic, and it is 
not clear to what extent the tax base is affected by economic grovrth, 
Without noinr^ specifically into the proerescivity of the rate structure, 
it waG assumed that inheritance revenue will grow due to the fact that 
as incciue increases in the state, wealth will increase leading to an 
increase in the tax base. 
The income elasticity of the inheritance tax amounted to l.ij857, 
while the structural changes instituted in 1965 seem to have no 
effect on the behavior of the tax. 
The income elasticity of the insurance premium tax amounted to 
l.it82U vâth the minor base extension in 196^ having no effect on the 
revenue received from the tax source. 
The motor vehicle fuel tax seems to be one of the more in-elastic 
state tax sources with an income elasticity of 0.1^275} while the rate 
elasticity was 1.0750. 
The evaluation of the overall I elasticity of the tax system 
In this section a brief description of the income elasticity of the 
different Iowa taxes are presented. The income elasticity of the yield 
of a tax system as a whole or a group of taxes can be no greater than that 
of its most elastic component (at least if the components are additive 
and independent). This simple relationship may be shown as follows: 
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d(t* + t") 
3Y 
(t* + t") 
1 
(t»e» + t"e") (ii.55) (t' + t") 
IVhere T = t* -i- t" is the aggregate yield, t* and t" are the yields of the 
two conponents, Y is state personal income and e, e', and e" are the 
elasticities of the tax system and the coitponents, respectively. 
The total tax elasticity is thus equal to the weighted average of 
the elasticity of the components, the weights being the respective 
yields (61;). 
Another commonly known facx about income elasticity of the yield of 
any tax is the fact that the yield is uneffected by a proportional change 
in all the rates if the avoidance and incentive effects are neglected; if • 
all yields are affected proportionally relative yields in response to 
given changes in income will be unaffected. 
In this section the responsiveness of the Iowa tax system will be 
evaluated in terms of 
(1) changes in the elasticities of individual taxes due to legal 
changes in the tax base 
(2) changes in the overall system due to changes in the composition 
of tax payments 
(3) comparison of the income elasticity of IOTO tax sources with 
those made on a national basis 
lOil 
For sn assessment of the change in income elasticity due to the tax 
base and rate changes^ conipai'isons i-dll be made on the basis of state tax 
receipts in the 1^66-196? and the 1968-1969 fiscal years. 
The income elasticity and the changes in Iowa elasticity prior to 
1967 and after 196? are summarized in Table L.I8. 
Table ii.lS. The income elasticity of Iowa taxes 
Type Prior to 196? After 196? 
Sales and use tax 0.8957 .9393 
Income tax 1.7U75 1.731L 
Property tax 0,6800 O.68OO 
Insurance premiim tax l.U82it l.U82it 
Cigarette tax O.SlS3 0.$1$3 
Corporate income tax no income elasticity estimated 
Inheritance tax 1.U857 1,1;857 
Fuel tax O.Ii.275 0,k27$ 
TOTAL 0.8186 O.85I18 
The responsiveness of the sales and use tax increased from .8957 to 
.9393. This increase is due to the introduction of the new sales tax on 
services. The increase in income elasticity of the sales and use tax is, 
however, small in magnitude. The additional revenue from this base exten­
sion amounts to only $li;.5 million for the fiscal 1968, The estimated 
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income elasticity of the sales and use tax is id.thin the limits of 
national estimates, v;hich range from 0.9 to 1,0 (i;8). 
The income elasticity of the individual income tax prior to 196? 
xcas estimated at 1.7. Evidence presented earlier indicates that the 
income elasticity of the income tax did not change significantly over 
the time period 195S-59 to 1968-69. The minor changes in the income 
structure introduced over the time period seem to affect the responsive­
ness of this tax source only marginally. 
ÎÎ0 attcirot -will be made to compare the income elasticity of the 
income tax ivith other studies because of the heterogenity of tax rates 
and tax bases. 
The income elasticity of the property tax base (market value) 
amounted to 0.7. The structural changes in 1967 did hot affect the base 
elasticity. The only change in the property tax base was household 
personal property which was exempted from the property tax base, but 
amounted to only $60 million out of a total of $$.2 billion of assessed 
value in 1966, and can therefore be considered as an insignificant change 
in terms of affecting the income elasticity of the tax base. The exenç)-
tion of the personal property up to $2,500 of assessed value will have no 
effect on the property tax base elasticity, because the state aid that 
replaces the revenue loss due to this provision is still made on the 
basis of the assessed value of this property. The only change due to 
this provision is substitution of the revenue from property taxes for 
revenue from the state general fund. 
The property tax base elasticity of 0.7 is generally lower than 
three estimates of other investigators. The inelasticity of the property 
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tax "base v.-a.s veil established prior to the estimates made by Hetser in 
1959 (hQ) of 1.00. This unitary elasticity estimate led to considerable 
controversy. Ktarnoi-r (38) estimated the income elasticity of the property 
ta:: base at 0.9, while Groves and Kahn (lb), in their 1952 study, esti­
mated the assessed value income elasticity at 0.2. As far as the income 
elasticity of the property ta:c is concerned, one is inclined to agree 
i-jith Bridges (7) who contends that the income elasticity of the property 
tax "base depends primarily on the period "under consideration and the 
definition of the property tax base itself. Therefore, definite norms 
vrith respect to the income elasticity of the market value of taxable 
property do not e:cist. 
In the cases of the inheritance ta:c, insurance premium tax, and the 
fuel tax the elasticity estimated vjas 1.$, 1.5, and O.i;, respectively. 
These tax bases did not change significantly over the period under 
consideration. 
As far as the state corporate income tax is concerned, no income 
elasticity estimates of this elusive tax base were made. Hovrever, due to 
the progressiveness introduced in the rate structure, it was estimated 
that the rate elasticity increased to 1.13, which would tend to make this 
tax source more responsive. As was the case with the state income tax, no 
comparison of the estimates reported for Iowa Trrlth other studies is made 
because of differences in the tax base and rate structure. 
To estimate the change in the overall elasticity of the lovia tax 
system, it is necessary to assume that the income elasticity of the various 
taxes is additive, i.e., that the tax sources are essentially independent. 
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VJith a substantial change in the receipts mix, this assumption becomes 
questionable (ii.6). 
The overall income elasticity of the loivra tax system vas estimated 
assuming that the different ta>: sources are independent and that property 
tax receipts id.ll behave in correspondence vrilth the property tax base. 
The overall elasticity estimate prior to 196? "was O.8I86 and after 196? 
it increased to 0.85i;8. The increase in the overall Income elasticity 
of the lo'.ira tax sj'-stem is due to a change in the receipts mix, -with the 
substitution of the more elastic sales tax and income tax for the 
property tax. 
In the light of these estimates, one is forced to conclude that the 
grovrt-h of tax revenues •will have to be supplemented %d.th continual tax 
rate increases to finance public expenditures. The automatic grot-rbh in 
tax revenue due to economic gro"&rth seems to be insufficient to provide 
adequate financial resources. 
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CHAPTER 5. ; REVENUE PROJECTIONS 
The factors that viill influence the level of state and local tax 
collections in future years can be summarized in three stages: 
(1) the influence of the national economic activity on the state 
economic activity 
(2) the influence of state economic activity on the state and local 
tax base 
(3) the various tax rate structures and tax bases 
These interrelationships are illustrated in Figure 5.1. In the 
preceding chapters stages 2 and 3 have been analyzed. However, as 
indicated in Figure 5.1j tax yields are the result of a conçlex set of 
interrelationships. A general model can be constructed to describe the 
relationship between iiie public and the private sectors. Such a mod^ 
has not been attempted because a behavioral theory of the public economy 
is lacking and, secondly, because a state*s econonqr is basically an open 
system, which makes a state model somewhat questionable. Apart from the 
mentioned reasons, a detailed state economic model requires a substantial 
amount of accurate data on the state level and such data are not readily 
available. 
Most of the studies made in the area of public revenue projections, 
both on the state and national level, d^end on exogenously specified 
variables which are usually reduced to some income variable like state 
personal income or gross national product on the national level (10). A 
somewhat similar procedure will be followed in this chapter. 
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state Economic Projections 
The projections of future state and local government tax revenue are 
"based on the state's economic gro%fth potential. A detailed state economic 
gro'rt'bh model which describes Iowa's economy in full is not available, 
necessitating the use of a more aggregative state economic model. Such a 
model was developed by Maki (itl) for the loi-ra, Office of Planning and 
Programming (lOPP), The objective of this model was to project the most 
iitroortant variables, such as population, employment, output, and income, 
for the state of Iowa as well as for 16 homogenous economic areas in.thin 
Iowa. These projections were made for 1970, 1975, and 1980. The pro­
cedure used to estimate these aggregate measures of potential growth vias 
based on a trend analysis supplemented by the Iowa input-output model. 
The projection procedure used by Maki is employment oriented. The 
movements in employment in the state are considered to be the primary 
determining factor of the grovrth potential in Iowa. The lli sectors making 
up the economy were divided into three enployment groups, namely, agricul­
ture, manufacturing, and nonr-commodity sectors. The projection procedure 
for each group was different, but in general the projections considered 
the demographic sector (supply of labor) as well as the state's demand 
for jobs by analyzing the factors influencing the demand for jobs in the 
specific sectors. 
Gross output projections wore based on the ninety-eight sector input-
output model of the loi-ia economy. These projections took into account the 
impact of changing levels of final demand, available resources, capital 
productivity and institutional factors. 
in 
Outpui>;per--;:orker ratios were estimated, for I960 for the ninety-ei^ht 
sectors and the groivth rates for labor productivity derived by Almon (2) 
were applied to the estimates. Value added was estimated for each sector 
by appl^ông the I960 ratios of value added to gross output, as derived 
by Barnard (U). 
IDmploynent by category was used in the calculation of state wage and 
salary and proprietary income per worker for I960 by dividing employment 
into the total income by employment category. A groifth rate was calculated 
for wages for I960 to 1975 using the 1975 wage estimates by Maki (i;0). 
This rate was then used to estimate wages for 1965, 1970, and 1980, 
The major indicators of the future development of the state of Iowa 
are summarized in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. Projections of the major economic variables in Iowa for 
I960 to 1980 
i960 
Projections Percentage 
change 
1970-1975 1970 1975 1980 
Population (000) 2,757 2,937 3,033 3,149 3.26 
Employment (000) 1,019 1,124 1,198 1,270 6.58 
Total state personal income^ 
($000,000) 5,475 8,311 10,359 12,816 24.59 
Per capita personal income^ 1,985 2,831 3,105 4,070 20.62 
Total state personal income^ 
($000,000!current dollars) 5,^75 10,lLiU 13,570 17,944 33.77 
Per capita personal income 
(current dollars) 1,985 3,li5U 5,698 29.53 
I960 dollars. 
^The estimates of current income are based on the real income estimates 
of the lOPP-series but it was assumed that the overan price level win 
reach 122.0 in 1970 and 131.0 in 1975, with 1957-59 as the base year. 
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Projections of the loira. tax revenue mil be based on these aggregate 
indicators of the state's future groirt-h potential. 
Projections of State and local Tax Revenue 
A realistic tax program in Iowa mil reflect the pressures of expend­
iture requirements on public revenue, just as revenue prospects are 
restraints on the grovrth of expenditures. In the final analysis expend­
itures and revenue projections must be related and balanced. The problem 
here is limited to the projection of the state and local tax revenue under 
existing tax rates and existing tax structures for Iowa. 
Iowa income tax 
The Iowa individual income tax is the. revenue source with the 
greatest potential for change in the future, in the event of state 
revenue needs. The attractiveness of the income tax in the state and 
local fiscal structure is attributed to various desirable properties, 
among which are administrative ease and equity considerations. This tax 
source i-âll therefore most likely be one of the first tax sources under­
going tax base and rate changes. 
Historically the definition of the income tax base for Iowa followed 
the specifications applicable to the federal individual income tax and 
it is likely to do so in the future. The federal income tax base, however, 
has been changed recently (8). Several relief provisions have been 
instituted among which the most irrçiortant are the increases in personal 
exemptions and standard deductions and a reduction in the tax rate for 
single persons. The various provisions mil partially go into effect in 
in the 1970 income tax year. The full effect of all the provisions will 
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not be realised until 1973. It is estimated, nationally, that the full 
cffcct of the new federal tax provisions -will result in an approximate 
réduction in federal tax liabilities of 10 percent. These reductions are 
not distributed uniformly across all income groups, but favor taxpayers 
in the income groups belo-w $15j000 adjusted gross income. This reduction 
in the federal tax liability -will influence Iowa income "tax payments 
because of the deductibility of federal -taxes on lovia returns. 
State income -tax projections will be made -under various assujr^tions 
about federal income tax developments with consequent effects on the 
amount of federal taxes deductible on Ioi-ia income tax returns. Alternative 
state income tax rate structures might be considered and the effect of 
rate changes can easily be determined -i-ri-th. the state income "tax simulation 
model. It would be hazardous, however, to anticipate specific state 
income tax rate structures in the future. For projec-tion purposes it will 
be assumed that the state income tax rate structure -will remain unchanged. 
The specific projections of state income tax receipts presented here 
are based on the follo-^jing assumptions: 
(1) State income tax statute will remain as it was under the 1967 
state income tax rates and the 1967 federal income tax structure -will 
remain as it was before the surtax >ra.s enacted. This projection will be 
made on the basis of income elasticities estimated earlier. 
(2) A similar projection -will be made based on the simulation model 
:-d.th the assumption that the income distribution tidll change proportionally 
over time and that new income -tax returns will follow- a similar distribu­
tion as that found for existing returns in each specific year. 
nu 
(3) An estimate uill be made to assess the effect on the Iowa income 
tax liabilities in ease of a proportional 10 percent reduction in federal 
tax liabilities. This estimate vjill serve as an indication of the 
influence of the federal income tax law changes on Iowa income tax 
receipts. It is assumed that the full effect of the provisions is appli­
cable on the 1967 income. 
(h) Income tax projections tcill be made based on the assumption that 
the deductibility of federal taxes on Iowa income tax returns vôll be 
el±rninated. 
(5) Income tax projections will be made of the lovia income tax 
liabilities to assess the effect of a state income tax based on federal 
income tax payments. ÏVo alternative procedures will be followed: 
(a) a progressive rate structure as described in chapter four 
(b) a proportional structure yielding the same amount of revenue 
as the present state income tax. 
The different projections will be presented in Table 5.2 with the 
prediction method indicated numerically, according to the description 
above. 
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Table 5.2. State individual income tax projections for the period 1967 
to 1975 ($000,000) 
„ . Percentage 
Projection 1967 — change 
method 1967 Simulation 1970 1975 1967-1975 
1 91.5-
2 - 93.9 
3 - 95.2 
h - 122.5 
5a 91.5 
5b 91.5 
113.8 181.1 197.9 
125.9 199.2 212.1 
163.2 258.0 210.6 
133.8 283.9 310.3 
110.8 167.7 183.3 
Projection three is an indication of the effect of the federal income 
tax relief measures on the loiva income tax liabilities. It seems that if 
the measures were in full effect on 1967 income, that total income tax 
receipts in Iowa "would have increased by only $1.3 million or l.U percent. 
j^-opcrty tax projections 
Both the property tax base and property tax revenues are discusscd in 
this section. The property tax base projections to 1975 are made on the 
basis of the income elasticities of the property tax estimated earlier, 
implying that the grovrth in the market value of taxable property is going 
to follow the same basic pattern as it demonstrated over the 1956-66 
decade. A similar procedure was used ifith the projection of the assessed 
value of taxable property. The projection of assessed value is somewhat 
uncertain because of the variation in assessment practices in loi-js. Due 
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Table 5-3. Market value and asscsncd 
1966 to 1975 ($000,000) 
value of • taxable property in lovra 
Typo of Property 1966 
Projections 
1970 1975 
Pcrcentase 
chzmge to 
1970-75 
Market value; 
Fam realty 10,533 11,991 lii,550 21.3 
Residential realty 7,031 8,290 10,596 27.8 
Commercial and 
Industrial realty 2,629 3,009 3,681 22.3 
Public utilities 1:685 1,986 2,5a 27.9 
Personal property 3;21L 3,513 b,08l 16.2 
TOTAL 21,095 28,789 35,i4i9 23.1 
Assessed value: 
Farm realty 2,268 2,985 3,870 29.6 
Residential realty 1,655 1,97U 2,570 30.2 
CoiïSiercial and 
Industrial realty 760 87h 1,080 23.5 
Public utilities 70lt 809 999 23.L 
Personal property 791 659 975 13.5 
TOTiil 6,178 7,501 9,l9ii 26.5 
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to the specification that all property must be uniformly assessed at 27 
percent of "market value" (26), and the apparent determination of the 
Department of Revenue to take a more active role in the supervision of 
the assessment practices of county assessors, it is assumed that the 
assessment-market value ratios ijill reflect the gro-vrth in the market 
value of taxable property for lovja in future years. 
The future development in market value and assessed value of prop­
erty taX; based on the income elasticities of the various components of 
the tax base, is presented in Table 5.3. 
The assessed value of taxable property is based on income elastic­
ities, except in the case of farm realty where a change in the reassess­
ment practices was implemented in 1968. The reassessment of farmland vjas 
based on 27 percent of "market value." This "market value" is determined 
by a weighing procedure where $0 percent of the value is determined by 
the sales-assessment ratio, and 50 percent by the capitalization of net 
farm income. The determination of the market value of farmland is quite 
different from that used in the past. It is therefore assumed that farm­
land tJiH be assessed on the same basis as the 1968 adjustments in the 
future. 
The next step is the projection of property tax revenue itself. 
Property taxes are to a great extent determined by local expenditures. A 
balancing approach between local expenditure and property taxes idll 
therefore be used as postulated in chapter four. 
The major e^œlanatory variables involved in property tax (PT) projec­
tions, apart from state personal income movements, are intergovernmental 
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revenue (R^), revenue from local sources other than property taxes 
and local government expenditures (G^). 
The projected levels of these variables are presented in Table 
Table 5 ,U. Projected per capita levels of intergovernmental revenue ; 
miscellaneous other revenue, local expenditure, and property 
taxes 
Projections _ „ 
Percentage Change 
Variable 1968-6? 1970-71 1975-76 1968-69 to 1975-76 
Rt/pc $12U.95 $130.68 $1U6.18 16.99 
I-ïR^/pc 50.20 55.41- 68.aL 36.33 
G^/PC 355.20 i;08.60 555.70 56,liO 
PT/pc * 173.bO 213.80 327.80 89.01; 
^Tet property taxes, i.e., gross property tax minus personal property 
replacement, land tax credit, homestead and military exemption. 
The future movements in the two most important variables, namely, 
state and federal aid (R^) to local governments and the level of miscel­
laneous revenue (l-iRj.) of local units, are quite uncertain. Federal aid to 
local governments has been very small in the past, but there are some 
indications that it mif^t increase in the future. In the projections in 
Table 5.U, it is assumed that state aid to local governments is going to 
level off, after the substantial increase in state aid during 1967 and 
1968, to the historical rate of increase prior to 1967. This might be 
highly questionable since the development is toi-rard some increase in 
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federal aid to local xxnits and the future existence of a strong local 
resistance against property tax rate increases ; i-ihich mil tend to force 
more state aid to local units. 
Tiiis aspect is i-rell illustrated in the case of lom lûunicipal revenue 
tThere the legal limit to property taxation is 30 mills on taxable property. 
In many cases the legal limit is already reached with further groi-jth in 
the revenue dependent on the growth of taxable property m thin the 
jurisdiction, with the generally low elasticity of taxable property, 
municipalities mil have to acquire more state aid or find some way to 
increase revenue from miscellaneous sources (sources other than property 
taices). 
In the projections stated in Table 5.3^ it is assumed that miscel­
laneous revenue of local governments is going to increase at the historical 
rate. 
Based on the above mentioned assumptions it is anticipated that 
property taxes per capita will increase from $213.8 in 1970-71 to $327.S 
in 1975-76, which implies a per capita increase of 10.7 percent in 
property taxes annually. 
Iowa corporate income tax 
The definition of the Iowa corporation income tax base makes projec­
tion difficiTlt due to the fact that the tax base is defined as a proportion 
of sales of Iowa based corporations to lowans in relation to local sales. 
State corporate income tax projections are made in terms of the hypothesis 
advanced previously that Iowa's corporate income tax can be explained by 
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Iowa's share in Ihe national economic activity based on the ratio of 
personal incozncs and the behavior of national corporate profits. 
lova's share of national economic activity is based on the historical 
trends of the tvo components, namely, Iowa personal income and national 
personal income. National corporate profits were estimated on the basis 
of a gross national product elasticity of 0.83. 
Table 5.5. Projections of state corporate income tax 
Projections 
Items 1563-65 1565-70 1570-71 157li-75 
National corporate profit 
($000,000^000) 78.3 82.7 86.7 108.2 
Ratio of loifa income to 
national income 0.01375 0.01325 0.01310 0.01251 
îlet Iov:a tsccable corporate 
profits ($000,000} 389.2 lOO.l: 121.3 552.6 
Iov:a. corporate income tax 
($000*, 000) 
2ii.l 2I1.5 26.6 36.6 
Sales and "use tax 
There have been several structural changes in this tax source. Hoa'^-
ever, the actual, data for the fiscal year 1968-6$? seems to indicate that 
this tax source behaved as postulated in chapter four. The most uncertain, 
aspect of the sales and use tax was the behavior of the taxable service 
basCo Any administrative difficulties that have been encountered during 
the first year of the new tax should have been straightened out by the 
second year and the collections from this source of $15.1 for the fiscal 
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year, 1968-65?, is very close to the projections made earlier. This tax 
soui'ce Kiif^ht show an abnorsial increase during 1969-70 due to the collection 
or the service tax on advertising and new construction, which was valid 
for about one year after the initiation of the new tax base, but T-jas not 
collected during the 1968-69 fiscal year, 
A similar arguiaent can be made in the case of the use tax where the 
repeal of the "not readily available" clause showed an insignificant 
influence on use tax collections. The reason for this might be that this 
tax source is difficult to administer and thus subject to a high avoidance 
rate. A definite conclusion can be reached only after auditing proce­
dures, which occur infrequently. 
Assuming that the results of chapter four are an accurate reflection 
of the actual sales and use tax behavior, the foUotving projections of 
the sales and use tax are made for the period 1969-70 to 1975-76. 
Table 5.6. Sales and use tax projections 1968-69 to 1975-76 ($000,000) 
xype 
Sales tax: old base 
at 5 percent tax 157-9 lôli.l 207.L 216.5 37.11 
Use tax: 
at 3 percent tax 37.6 UO.l 57.5 61.3 63.03 
Taxable services 15.1 16.3 21;.6 26.7 76.82 
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Other taxes 
The remaining; major tax sources are the cigai-ette ta%; ins-urance 
preniun tax, motor vehicle fuel tax, and the inheritance tazc. The future 
Sroivth of these taxes are shoivn in Table 5.7. 
Table 5-7. Projections of the cigarette tax, insurance premitm ta:c, fuel 
tax, and inheritance tax for 1969-70 to 1975-76 ($000,000) 
Projections „ ^ ^ 
Percentage Increase 
Tax Source 1968-6$ 1969-70 1971-75 1975-76 1968-69 to 1975-76 
Cigarette 29.5 30.9 36.5 37.8 28.13 
Insurance premium 11.5 15.5 23.2 25.0 72.11 
Motor vehicle fuel 106.ii 109.1 126.5 129.8 21.99 
Inheritance 15.2 16.1 2ii.3 26.2 72.36 
Several other tax sources of small magnitude were omitted. Among 
these are the real estate transfer stamp tax, chainstore tax, beer tax, 
and the tobacco products tax. 
Sunjiary 
The projections of loi-ia tax revenue are s-ummarized in Table 5.8, The 
actual tax collections in 1968-69 as well as the revenue projections for 
1975-76 are presented. The figure presented in parenthesis below each tax 
source is the percentage contributed by the specific tax to total revenue. 
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Table ^.8. Projections of state-local ta:c revenue and the composition of 
tax sources for 1968-69 and 1975-76 (.'i)000,000) 
Tax I96B-69 1975-76 
Sales and use 211.7 305 
( 21.1) ( 17.5) 
Income 
Personal 99.0 181; • ( 9.8) ( 10.0) 
Corporate 21.1 38 
( 2.3) ( 2.2) 
Cigarette 29.5 37 ( 2.9) ( 2.2) 
Insurance premium llu5 25 
( I M )  ( l.L) 
Motor fuel 106.h 130 
( 10.7) ( 7.5) 
Inheritance 15.2 26 
( 1.5) ( 1.5) 
Property 505.9 99a 
( 50.3) ( 57.1) 
TOTAL 1,006.2 1,739 
( 100.0) ( 100.0) 
These results indicate that tax revenue increase from $1,006.2 
rrillion to $1,739 million. Based on the projections, it seems that the 
property tax t-rill increase in prominence to the level reached before the 
1967 property tax relief measures were introduced. The figures shox-x that 
property taxes mil increase from 50 percent to 57 percent of total tax 
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CHàPTER 6, SmmRY MD CX)NCIUSIONS 
State and local govenments have to satisfy the rapidly increasing 
demand for public goods "with limited resources available. As the society 
grows more affluent, they demand more and better public services. 
Although there is general agreement on the need of increasing public 
expenditure, the payment of state and local taxes meets "with less 
enthusiasm. 
The availability of state and local revenue to satisfy future growth 
in public expenditure is dependent on the responsiveness of the various 
tax bases to economic growth, the introduction of new tax sources, or an 
increase in the rates of existing tax. In the absence of any significant 
new tax sources, the growth potential of state and local tax is solely a 
function of tax rates and tax base growth. 
The extension of tax bases or the increase in tax rates is usually 
met with considerable opposition and is usually an intensively contested 
political problem. The basic question therefore seems to be whether the 
state and local tax bases are sufficiently responsive to supply the 
financial resources needed. Only in the case where the state and local . 
tax bases are not responsive will there be a need for continual adjustment 
in tax rates and tax bases. 
The basic problem, considered throughout this analysis was the deter­
mination of the responsiveness of the tax base, abstracting from the 
discretionary tax rate or tax base changes. As far as possible the 
relevant tax data were adjusted to eliminate exogenous influences on the 
tax bases. 
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The responsiveness of the state income tax, state corporate income 
tax, property troccs, sales and use tocc, and various other consumption 
t;/pe taxes, such as cigarette taxes, insurance premium tax, motor vehicle 
fuel tax and state inheritance tajces, were estimated. 
In rcneral it can be said that the loira. tax structure is inelastic. 
The overall income elasticity of the tax system was estimated at 0.85, 
which is quite low, although the 196? tax reform measures were responsible 
for a slight increase in income elasticity from 0.81 to 0.85. 
The o:ily major tax source that is elastic is the state individual 
income tax i-jith an income elasticity coefficient of 1.7. Tifo smaller tax 
sources, namely, the insurance premium ta:c and inheritance tax, have 
income elasticities above unity. 
The sall.es and use tax has an income elasticity below unity and i^ith 
the initiation of tax on selected services, this tax source's income 
elasticity increased from 0,8? to 0.9h* This is by no means a spectacular 
increase because the elastic service base is relatively small in relation 
to the previous sales and use tax base. 
The state and local tax structure is still dominated by the property 
tax which is the single largest component in the state-local tax revenue 
system. The 1967 property tax relief measures resulted in the decrease of 
the contribution of this tax source from 60 percent to $0 percent of the 
total tax revenue. The property tax base (market value) has an income 
elasticity of 0.7 which contributes significantly to the low elasticity 
of the state-local tax-structure. 
One of the most significant results indicated by the tax revenue 
projections presented in chapter five is the fact that, based on the local 
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ezpenditizrc needsj property taxes v;o-jld increase relatively to other tazc 
sources, so mich so that by 1975-76 it i-jill again have moved up to 57 
percent of total tax revenue. This, of course, presupposes no change in 
the state-local tax structure. 
limitations of the study 
The major limitations of the study might be outlined as follows; 
(1) Only the responsiveness of existing tax bases was analyzed. 
Alternative definitions of the tax base were not evaluated because of 
data li natations. 
(2) The estimates of the grox/bh of tax bases in this study were of 
a simplified form. The major factors considered were movements in state 
personal income and population. These economic variables affecting the 
tax bases are rather aggregative. For instance, the property tscc base 
might be influenced by such factors as the building cycle activity and 
industrial development in the state. In the case of sales tazces, the 
responsiveness of various subcomponents of the tax base—for example, 
durable consumption, construction materials, and business purchases-
might be influenced by factors other than just personal income. 
(3) The assumption that the different tazces are independent is 
probably one of the major limitations of the analysis. Although the 
independence of the different tax sources is not, considered to be major, 
it still plays an unconsidered role. It might bo more relevant to 
analyze the various tax bases by means of a simultaneous equation model 
rather than the single equation models considered here. 
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SujTciostlonô for future reGcorch. 
(1) Dovelopincnt of a simultaneous equation model in order to estimate 
the interrelationships between the revenue side and the expenditure side 
of the state-local hudcet. 
(2) Development of a quarterly tax model in order to better predict 
ta:c revenue over the short run, •trhich might be useful in state budgetary 
processes and also as an early indicator of state economic activity over 
the short run. 
(3) Development of an income tax simulation model as was implemented 
here J but on a more disaggregated basis. The success of such a model will 
depend on the availability of more detailed data. 
(ii) A more detailed analysis of the determination of local expendi­
tures and the interrelationships between property ôaxes, new debt creation, 
and local expenditures. 
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APParoiX. Mmi\L STATE TAX COII£CTIOnS 
AND REIATED DATA 
Table 6.1. The major Iowa income tax variables for the period l%8-5)9 to I967-68 
Yoai' 
State Adjusted Not Federal Deductions 
Personal Income Gross Taxable Income Tax Iter.iixed and 
Income^ Tax^ !Cncome^ 3r.come^ Déductions^ Standard^ 
$000,000 $000 $000,000 $000,000 $000 $000 
IIujTiber of Credits^ Nyter 01 
Personal Dependents Returns^ 
000 000 000 
1950-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-61( 
1961-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
5,202 
5,319 
5,1,75 
5,71(3 
6,005 
6,352 
6,6).i9 
7,567 
8,3li7 
8,550 
9,102 
3h,061i 
3!i,60l, 
35,797 
39,b98 
1(2,390 
i4l(,079 
5k,935 
68,070 
81,550 
91,525 
90,959 
3,5143 
3,562 
3,682 
3,0142 
3,969 
1|,152 
1(,518 
l(,99l( 
5,692 
6,28k 
6,730 
2,036 
2,773 
2.057 
2,979 
3.058 
3,182 
3,567 
3,9k6 
14,14140 
1(,882 
5,177 
309 318 1,266 097 829 
1(1(5 31(2 1,105 066 7Ô1 
l(li6 379 1,227 889 79k 
h7h 399 . 1,233 907 . 801 
1(92 1(19 1,230 091 790 
517 1(53 1,361 782 820 
1(0)4 1(67 1,37k 921 039 
532 515 l,lil5 878 869 
619 607 1,556 993 907 
731 603 1,762 1,089 1,11(8 
883 -c 1,177 
Source; (33). 
^Chaney, ID.oyd, Iowa Department of Revenue, Des Moines, Iowa. Unpublished data. 
Private communication, 1969. 
'^ot available. 
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Table 6,2. Ad.'iustip.cnts in 
base structure 
the income tare series to the 1965 rate and 
Income Ta:c Change in Income Tax Due to: Income Tax 
Year Unadjusted^ 
$000 
Federal Taxes 
$000 
Rates Other 
$000 $000 
Adjusted 
$000 
19^8-59 31,061 888 — — 34,952 
19^9-60 3L,60L 1,049 — — 35,654 
1960-61 35,797 1,060 — • " 36,858 
1961-62 39,498 1,189 - — 40,687 
1962-63 42,390 1,290 — - 43,680 
1963-61 44,079 1,355 — — 45,434 
1961-65 54,935 547 — — 55,482 
1965-66 68,070 - 2,353 65,617 
1966-67 81,550 . - 2,898 78,652 
1967-68 91,525 - 8,530 2,233 85,228 
1968-69 98,959 _b _b _b 
^So-urce: (33). 
°îIot adjusted. 
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Table 6.3. Average state incotric ta:c payments per revarn "based on the fed­
eral income ta:c payments i-jith a progi-essive rate struct-ure^ 
Average Average 
A.G.I. Bracket Average Federal Income State Income 
A.G.I. Tax Payments Tax Payments 
3,001- U,000 $ 3,k92 $ 245 $ 16 
II,001- 5,000 h,h9h 350 27 
5,001- 6,000 5,501 h66 hi 
6,001- 7,000 6,197 581 56 
7,001- 8,000 7,492 699 72 
8,001- 9,000 8,L8b 831 93 
9,001- 10,000 9,k80 980 116 
10,001- 15,000 11,885 1,103 187 
15,001- 20,000 16,953 2,137 377 
20,001- 25,000 22,170 3,683 625 
25,001- 30,000 27,237 5,0k5 097 
30,001- 35,000 32,309 6.673 1,223 
35,001- ii0,000 37,379 8,365 1,561 
10,001- 1:5,000 it2,2i>6 10,191 1,926 
1:5,001- 50,000 ùY,boo 12,3k3 2,357 
50,001- 75,000 59,896 17,925 3,173 
75,001-100,000 85,360 30,Lk3 5,977 
100,001-150,000 118,832 ii9,lL;7 9,717 
150,001 and over 270,651t 139,557 27,799 
'"Chaney, Iloyd, lov.-a Department of Revenue, Des Moines, Iowa. 
Unpublished data. Private communication. 1969. 
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Table ô.Iu Calculation of the change in lo-vja income tax due to income 
and rate changes, respectively 
Tax Change Due to:^ 
Year TI^ 
(0000,000) 
fjl) 
(:;;000,000) 
R v4R AT 
($000,000) 
Rate Change 
TI' R) 
($000,000) 
jjncome 
T-TI* (A R) 
($000,000) 
19$8-$9 2,910 3a.9 1.20 
19$9-60 2,8S8 35.6 1.2k o.oil 0.7 L.LU -o.kL 
1960-61 2,911 36.9 1.25 0.01 1.3 0.29 1.01 
1961-62 3,069 ko.7 1.33 0.08 3.8 2.45 1.35 
1962-63 3,152 h3.7 1.39 0.06 3.0 • 1.89 1.11 
1963-OU 3,280 15.L 1.38-0.01 1.7 -0.33 2.03 
1^6h-6S 3,603 55.5 1.5ii 0.16 10.1 5.76 h.3h 
1965-66 3,913 65.6 1.66 0.12 10.1 .1.73 5.37 
1966-67 78.6 1.77 0.11 13.0 U.88 8.12 
1967-68 L,882 86.5 1.77 0.00 7.9 - 7.90 
TOTAL CEIimE 51.6 20.81 30.79 
a T 
T 
= TI. R 
= T* _ T 
= TI:. R; 
- TI* R 
= TI:" R: 
- TI:- R + TI-R - TI • R 
= TI»-A R + R(4 TI) 
T - R(A TI)= IT' (/V R) 
vhere T is state income tax, R is average tax rate, and TI is 
taxable income. 
^Source : (33). 
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Federal Tax Deductions 
Because of the lack of data on the state level on federal tax pay­
ments ^ a rather simplified federal tax model irjill be applied. The basic 
datum ivould be average "tax paid per income class. The average tax paid 
per return ivas used because it eliminates the problem of changing number 
of returns in each income class. A variable mean income id.thin each class 
might cause a bias. The actual mean income in each income class, hoî-xever, 
i-ras subject to small changes idLthout a definite pattern. 
The behavior of the average ta>; for each income group was fitted into 
a time-series equation of the folloi-ri.ng form: 
AT._^ - + Sg? + 
where 
AT J. = Average federal tax V 
i = Income groups 
T = 1953-1567 
Dy, = Dummy variable representing change in federal tax reported 
in 196Uj represented by 0 otheri-ri.se 
D/^ , = Dummy variable representing federal tax change 1965 to 
c>-o/' sSol, represented by 1, 0 otheri-n.se 
The average federal tax payment per retixrn in each income reflected 
no specific trend. The diimmy variables D^^ and D^^ ^  showed significance 
due to the lai-j changes. 
The average federal ta>: payments deducted on the loi-ra income ta:c 
returns are shoi-m in Table 6.5 for pay retiirns and Table 6.6 for no-pay 
Table 6.5. Avora^e fedeiT.l tax deductions by income group as reported on state income tax returns 
classified as pay returns for 19^9-60 to 1967-68% 
A,G.I. Group 
($000) 1959-60 
0- 1 
1- 2 
2- 3 
3- il 
li" 5 
^ 6 
6- 7 
7- 8 
8- 9 
9- 10 
10- li; 
20 
20- 22 
22- 30 
30- 35 
32- ho 
ho- 1,2 
L2- 20 
20- 72 
72-100 
100-120 
120 and over 
Average 
5 122 
289 
379 
J46O 
273 
707 
869 
1,080 
1,238 
1,779 
3,092 
k,276 
6,122 
8,10Ji 
10,lWi 
11,786 
13,991 
19,9hk 
30,962 
h9,032 
60,772 
732 
1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 
; iii2 
292 
376 
hSl 
271 
707 
821 
1,019 
1,212 
1,739 
3,028 
1,298 
6,290 
8,209 
10,022 
12,h28 
111, 212 
19,kl9 
30,189 
k2,308 
61,287 
731 
Year 
1963-6^ 196k-62 1962-66 1966-67 1967-6; 
; i2li $ 182 $ 123 $ 187 
290 283 307 2k9 
362 377 392 313 
1,26 k79 k69 386 
222 272 281 k86 
679 693 703 276 
822 823 821 699 
976 988 993 808 
1,123 1,128 1,170 929 
1,661 1,629 1,630 l,3k3 
2,821 2,888 2,882 2,227 
h,299 k,32l k,366 3,762 
2,912 6,013 6,03ii 2,199 
7,696 7,72k 7,k67 6,928 
9,61k 9,989 9,607 8,818 
11,1|66 12,lk3 11,936 10,1.68 
13,7),k 13,881 lli,037 12,278 
19,221 19,778 19,203 17,282 
29,697 32,182 32,018 28,2k3 
38,371 39,221 k8,293 39,296 
6k,113 92,227 62,276 27,107 
7k2 776 806 71I4 
I 123 
2L9 
317 
397 
1(86 
298 
693 
802 
92l( 
1,213 
2,l2k 
3,hh2 
 ,288 
 ,07k 
7,793 
9,611 
n,ii39 
16,688 
26,22k 
32,882 
90,727 
7lj2 
123 
232 
322 
lt02 
li99 
601 
709 
831 
926 
1,288 
2,222 
3,322 
1,722 
6,137 
7,836 
9,668 
11,133 
l6,2Lk 
27,600 
10,110 
78,278 
790 
117 
237 
3l'.lj 
k33 
232 
6k3 
721i 
876 
I,oo2 
1,372 
2,369 
3,212 
h,867 
6,369 
7,809 
9,1(62 
II,1(20 
12,939 
26,890 
37,7lil 
87,887 
827 
^Chaney, TJ.oyd, Ioi;a Department of Revenue, Des Moines, Iowa. Unpublished data. Private 
ccrcnujiication, 1969. 
Table 6.6, Average federal tax deductions by income gi'pup as reported on state income tax returns 
classified as no-pay for 19^9-60 to 3.967-6fP 
Year 3!ncon;e 
($000) 19^9-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 196>6h 196)1-63; 1965-66 1966-67 1967-60 
0- 1 $ 103 3; 62 $ 100 
1- 2 131 114 131 
2- 3 180 11(8 158 
3- 4 255 212 198 
4- 5 558 369 322 
5- 6 909 626 607 
6- 7 1,079 965 1,171 
7" 8 2,677 1,371 1,860 
8- 9 3,054 1,848 3,082 
9" 10 5,822 3,069 2,936 
10- 15 6,627 4,330 4,496 
15- 20 10,705 11,365 12,775 
20- 25 24,418 17,853 18,880 
25- 30 33,492 32,239 
25,270 
23,151 
30- 35 20,945 33,976 
35- 40 25,779 33,562 18,789 
40- 45 44,345 43,339 ' 38,436 
45- 50 35,038 30,568 54,192 
50- 75 40,247 48,852 53,040 
75-100 78,926 35,180 84,347 
100-150 177,914 115,139 99,075 
150 and over - 84,950 -
Average 19k 201 19^ 
8 101 
123 
15:8 
222 
1:13 
63h 
1,299 
1,688 
2,622 
3,079 
5,895 
7,527 
23,008 
20,588 
2l-.,780 
30,712 
18,557 
lf7,5Wi 
59,k71 
67,237 
130,855 
185 
$ 11.16 
118 
l'ïk 
" 226 
379 
609 
880 
1,239 
l,66h 
1,902 
3,625 
8,118 
11,988 
ll,6Di( 
15,959 
18,968 
47,631 
96,208 
26,548 
71,239 
157,586 
201 
A 224 
91 
121 
196 
• 301 
465 
668 
832 
I,039 
1,294 
2,596 
6,676 
7,249 
14,419 
16,368 
3,087 
6,976 
27,489 
67,961 
II,911 
82,500 
175 
$ 137 
92 
124 
181 
366 
504 
715 
789 
1,785 
1,186 
2,275 
7,414 
7,695 
12,455 
48,811, 
24,250 
17,321 
35,585 
70,685 
63,226 
105,299 
93,344 
181 
$ 48 
102 
134 
197 
341 
609 
1,046 
1,821 
2,102 
2,997 
6,562 
11,576 
13,119 
18,531 
27,343 
41,217 
30,424 
68,980 
122,447 
218,572 
153,978 
308,956 
142 
0 48 
104 
167 
259 
407 
734 
1,359 
2,070 
3,036 
3,852 
5,469 
9,382 
15,302 
18,242 
25,895 
19,914 
46,344 
92,948 
65,004 
41,741 
296,252 
319,133 
169 
^Chaney, Iloyd, Iowa Dspartment of Revenue, Des Koines, Iowa. Unpublished data. Private 
communication. 1969. 
MA 
Itemised Deductions 
A'similar function i-ra,s fitted to the itemized deductions sho^m on Iowa 
income tax returns, as in the case of federal income tax deductions. 
The data, however, showed no general time trend. In fact, the average 
itemized deduction per return in each income class stayed virtually con­
stant except in the highest income brackets. It was therefore decided to 
use the mean itemized deduction per AGI income class in the income tax 
simulation model. 
Table 6.7. Average itemized deduction per return by income group for 
1959-60 to 1967-68% 
income Grour» Average itemized z 
Mean AGI Deduction (Z) AGI 
2- 3 $ 2,533 $ 166 .0657 
3- il 3,510 377 .107k 
h- 5 k,501 600 .1333 
^ 6 5,199 883 .1605 
6- 7 6,190 1,079 .1662 
7- S 7,LOO 1,228 =166L 
8- 9 - 8,h69 1,356 .1601 
9- 10 9,^67 1,503 .1587 
10- 15 11,781 1,731 .11:69 
15- 20 17,057 2,111: .1239 
2C- 25 22,205 2,b59 .1107 
25- 30 27,217 2,828 .1037 
30- 35 32,335 3,325 . .1028 
35- IiO 37,352 3,793 .1015 
1:0- hS ^2,285 b,2L8 .look 
15- 50 17,LOO 5,07L .1070 
50- 75 59,761 6,3^6 .1061 
75-100 85,350 10,279 .120k 
100-150 118,860 18,535 .1559 
150 and over 275,262 57,57U .2089 
Average .1013 
^Chancy, Lloyd, Icû-ia Department of Revenue, Des Moines, Iowa. 
Unpublished data. Private communication. 1569. 
11:3 
No conparable data are available for itemized deductions on the no-
pay returns. Tiie itemized deductions for no-pay returns for 196? and 
1968 v:erc, acquired^ but from, such a limited observation no valid generali­
zation seems possible. However, the average itemized deduction per return 
i--as remarkedly stable over the two years under consideration for income 
groups below $15,000. Very few returns fall in the income groups above 
• $15,000 and it i-ias therefore not considered even though the average 
deductions per return in this group were rather unstable. 
The level of itemized deductions was, however, considerably higher 
than those in comparable pay return income groups. This explains at 
least one reason wiiy these returns fall into the no-pay category. 
Table 6.0. Average itemized deduction per no-pay return over the 1^67-
1968 period^ 
Income Gtoutd itemized Mean Z 
($000) ' AGI Deduction (Z) I5Ï 
0- 1 $ 608 $ 55 .0901; 
1- 2 1,1 i6ù 151 .1031 
2- 3 2,1:51 iiOi- .161.8 
3- Il 3A27 765 .2232 
II- 5 1:,L00 1,281: .2918 
5- 6 5,li02 2,015 .3730 
6- 7 6,10.3 2,760 .2323 
7- 8 7,L56 3,530 .1:731: 
8- 0 8,122 1^278 .5709 
9-10 9,501 5,087 .5351: 
10-15 32,717 5,02L .1:287 
rîcan .1722 
^Chancy, Hoyd, Iowa Department of Revenue, Des Moines, Iowa. 
Unpublished data. Private communication. 19^9» 
m 
Although the average deduction per return remained relatively 
constant by income group, a valid question might be what happened to the 
number of itemized deductions since 1958-55' as a percentage of the total 
number of returns. 
Table 6.9. dumber of itemized returns over the period 1959-60 to 1966-67^ 
^Timber of Total Number Percentage 
Year Itemized Returns of Returns Itemized Returns 
1969-60 301,205 781,1(22 38.56 
1960-61 32â,95l 791^,105 ho. 92 
1961-62 372,230 801,179 it6.l6 
1962-63 386,663 '797,796 18.1,7 
1963-6I1 113,583 819,660 50.16 
1961-65 395,708 838,567 1:7.19 
1965-60 m., 321 879,537 17.11 
1966-67 171,166 987,572 il 7.71 
Ch?j-^ey, Lj.oyd, lovja Department of Revenue, I!es î-îoines, Iowa. 
Unpublj.shed data. Private communication. 1969. 
As is indicated there was no appreciable change in the percentage of 
itemized returns since 1902-63. 
Finally the usefulijicss of the data on itemized deductions is severely 
limited by the lack of disaggregated data, because the deductions should 
show the direct iniO.uence of a change in the different types of state-
local taxes in Iov;a since these taxes are deductible on lovra returns. 
The implications of possible tax structure changes are very important in 
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detemdrrlnf the responsiveness of the state income tax "because it affects 
the ta;c base. No attempt has been made so far by the Iowa Department of 
Hevenue to disaggregate itemized deductions. 
State Income Tax Sanple 
A 1 percent sample i-:as dravm from the state income tax returns for 
the 1967 income tax year. Since the population was not uniformly distrib­
uted in the different income groups, a uniform 1 percent sample could not 
be drai-m from every income group because i;i the higher income groups, 
•where the population becomes small, an insufficient number of observations 
would result. 
It was therefore decided to take the first 25 observations in each 
ijncome group and then, after that, every 100th observation. This sampling 
procedure resulted in about a 1 percent sample in the income groups >7ith 
a large nmnber of observations, while the sampling fraction was higher in 
income f-roups where the number of observations was small, 
D7 this sample is used to study the movement-of returns among income 
groups over time and by implication the income tax payments from the 
cz-zinting population, a weighing procedure becomes necessary. Each 
observation was weighted so that the sampling fraction in each income 
group amounted to a 1 percent sample of the corresponding population. 
]16 
Table 6.10. The distribution of income tax retxirns and the distribution 
of the sample a^iong income group for returns filed for the 
1967 income tax year 
A.G.I. 
Income Class 
($000) 
Pay Returns No-pay Returns 
Popitlation Sample Pop-ulation Sample 
0- .5 5 5 31,096 312 
.5- 1 5 5 63,103 615 
1- 2 12,787 lli9 136,595 1,300 
2- 3 72,910 72U 59,301 567 
> U 92,900 912 30,070 299 
il- 5 97,976 958 10,711; 122 
6 102,301 1,001 3,290 56 
6- 7 98,566 966 1,11:7 36 
7- 3 81;319 831 h6l 30 
8- 9 63,211: 631 2h7 28 
9- 10 h3,939 UU8 Ihh 27 
10- 13' 79,95b 797 278 28 
15- 20 18,056 201 55 26 
20- 25 7,iiiiO 98 39 26 
2>- 30 3,853 63 22 21 
30- 35 2,Ilk h9 55 15 
35- iiO 1,517 ho 7 7 
he- hS 1,117 36 3 
Ii5- 50 771 33 5 5 
50- 75 1,609 1:1 8 8 
75-100 133 30 5 5 
100-150 221 28 2 1 
150 and over ni 27 5 5 
Rejects 2 2 2i;,308 277 
TOTAL 786,560 8,075 361,251 3,819 
3lt7 
Table 6.11. The mmiber of reùirns, apportionable income and net taxable 
incop.e for corporations not fully >âthin Io%%^ 
Business Class 
Number 
of 
Returns 
Apportionable 
Net Income 
($000) 
Percentage 
Sales in 
loi-ra 
Net Tac-zable 
Ihcone 
($000) 
Contractors 232 80,186.8 7.U6 5,989.0 
Fanners 8 106.1 52.02 55.2 
Finance 19 60,818.0 1.U5 885.0 
Manufacturing 730 8,685,S3i:.6 0.51; k7,286.k 
Natural resources 16 i;96,ll5.2 0.36 1,829.2 
Newspapers 7 10,965.5 35.21 3,860.7 
Utilities 13 51t2,997.7 10.86 59,021.3 
Retailers 338 811;, 693.7 2.60 21,197.3 
Services 196 6,387,311.11 0.08 5,W;3.3 
Transport 89 lh5,U:0.0 1.81. 2,678.6 
I-Jholesalers 331 561,226.3 2.51; 31,283.9 
î-ïï-scellaneous (real 
estate rental) 50 22,179.6 5.53 1,227.9 
Unclassified 2 47.8 97.07 i;6.L 
TOTAL 2,031 17,807,622.8 0.92 163,801;. 2 
'"Cnaney, Hoyd, lova Department of Revenue, Des Hcines, xoi-ia. 
Unpublished data. Private coimunication. ISSS, 
Treble 6.1:1. The ntuiibcr of returns and net taxable income for corporations 
f-ully '.d-tMn lovra, 196?^ 
Business Class Number of Returns Wet Taxable Income ($000) 
Contractors 58ii 12,621;.L 
Farmers 193 1,950.8 
Finance I4I8 6,5^ 0.5 
I lanuf acturizig Wi9 295.0 
Natural resources 36 ' 1,3L6.6 
T'Teifspap er s 35 1,829.2 
Utilities • 152 27,338.2 
Retailers 2,055 38,663.3 
Services 1,59U 20,371.2 
Transport I69 3,6L9.0 
T-JholescG.ers ii62 13,690,8 
rUscellaneous 783 6,709.2 
Unclassified 9 h2,2 
TOTAL 6,939 159,050.3 
^Chaney, lioyd, lova Department of Revenue, Des Moines, Iowa. 
Unpublished data. Private communication. 1969. 
Table 6.13. Distribution of taxable income of corporations not fully vrithin lowa^ 
Business Class 
Nujnber 
$2^,000 
of Corporal 
02^\OOO-
$100j000 
J.ons 
$100,000 
and over 
$25,000 
Taxable 
#25,000" 
$100,000 
Income {^'.00'. 
$100,000 
and over 
Total 
Contractors 188 31 31 1,289.1 1,388.3 3,311.6 5,989.0 
Faj;i(iers 8 - 55.2 - " 55.2 
I'Unance 16 3 ** 103.1 781.9 - 885.0 
Manufactmûng li3'3 160 n7 3,bLl.h 7,863.9 35,981.0 a7,286.h 
natural resources 7 k 5 9U.6 179.5 1,555.1 • 1,829.2 
llev;s])apers 2 1 1) I1.2 85.2 3,771.3 3,860.7 
Utilities 2 1 9 25.5 3k.7 58,961.1 59,021.3 
Retailors 2li6 ^8 3)i 1,835.2 2,835.9 16,526.2 21,197.3 
Services 161 26 9 800.6 1,323.3 3,319.3 5,lili3.2 
Transpoi't 67 16 6 1,86.5 9Wt.8 l,2ii7.3 2,678.6 
V.Qiolesalors 22U 72 35 1,7/(7.2 3,651.3 8,882.h lit,283.9 
Miscellaneous ho 7 3 250.9 355.5 621.h 1,227.9 
Unclassified 2 - lj6.h - - lt6,)i 
TOTAL l,kl6 379 235 10,179.9 19, liii7.it 1314,176.8 163,80k.2 
Tax paid I1O7.2 977.3 10,11,6.6 11,531.1 
a 
Chaney, IJ-oyd, 
comniunication. 1969. 
Iowa Depar'tment of Revenue, Des Moines, Ioi;a. , Unpublished data. Private 
Table 6,l)j. Distribution of taxable income of corporations ftOly vrithin lowa, 15*67^ 
Business Class 
Huiibcr of J^.eturns 
i 
^
 
1
 
•1^ %
 Incone ($000) 
$2^^000 #25% 000" 
$100,000 
$100,000 
and over 
$25,000 $25,000-
$100,000 
$100,000 
and over 
Total 
Contractors 1,^6 loh 2k 3,932.9 k,728.0 3,963.5 12,62k.h 
Farmers 180 12 1 1,311.3 173.3 166.2 1,950.8 
Finance 3^7 58 3 . 2,893.7 2,^78.2 1,168.6 6,5b0.5 
Manufacturing 322 92 35 2,813.8 h,kho.2 17,Oho.9 2k,29k.9 
Natural resources 20 10 6 157.3 135.8 753.L ' • l,3k6.6 
Newspapers 26 5 k 179.9 216.8 l,h02.5 1,829.2 
Utilities 113 29 10 1,056.0 l,3k3.2 2k,938.9 27,338.2 
Retailers 1,762 263 30 15,676.2 10,669.h 12,317.7 38,663.3 
Services l,h23 ]Jt7 2h 8,983.0 6,219.3 5,138.9 20,371.2 
Transport 130 33 6 1,110.3 1,500.6 1,038.1 3,6k9.0 
V/liolesal(jrs 3^8 97 7 3,306,8 h,025.1 6,358.8 13,690.8 
Miscellaneous 729 3 k,305.7 1,919.9 k83.5 6,709.2 
Unclassified 9 - - 1|2.2 - - k2.2 
TOTAL 5,883 901 152 45,769.1 38,509.8 7L,615.0 158,893.9 
Tax paid 1,829.7 1,860.0 h,753.2 8,kk2.9 
^Chaney, U.oyd, lowa Department of Revenue, Des Moines, lova. Unpublished data. Private 
c onirnuni cation. 196?. 
Table 6,15. Major variables influencing state corporate incojae tax payruents for Ippû-l?^! 
to I96G-I969 
Apportionnble Iowa U.S. Corporate 
Actual State Corporate State Tax ' Corporate Profit After Profits Before 
Tax Collections^ Hate Federal Tax Deduction'' Tax^ 
($000,000) ($000,000) ($000,000,000) 
19^0-^1 3.0 2.0 150.0 38.5 
2.8 2.0 Iho.o 39.1 
1952-53 2.3 2.0 115.0 33.8 
1953-5k 2.2 2.0 110.0 3k.9 
193'h-55>' 2.2 2.0 110.0 32.1 
1955-56 3.2 2.5 128.0 i|2.0 
1956-57 3.8 3.0 127.0 111. 8 
1957-58 3.1 2.5 12ii.0 39.8 
1958-59 2.5 2.0 125.0 33.7 
1959-60 3.7 2.5 3i|8.0 b3.7 
1960-61 h.h 3.0 lli7.o ho.l 
1961-62 ii.il 3.0 lii7.0 ho. 3 
1962-63 ii.6 3.0 153.3 hit. 7 
1963-6)4 5.0 3.0 167.0 h9.1 
1961,.-65 5.9 3.0 197.0 55.6 
1965-66 6.6 3.0 220.0 63.6 
1966-67 9.5 li.o 237.5 69.0 
1967-68 19.0 M - 78.0 
1968-69 2b.1 6.2 389.2 88.3 
^Source: (33). 
^Soui'-ce: (36). 
Table 6.IS' (Continued) 
Federal , Average Rate of 
Year Tax liabilities Federal Corporate 
($000,000,000) Taxation 
195C-M 16.7 1(3.1( 
19^ 1-^ 2 21.0 53.7 
19S%-23 17.6 52.6 
19^ 3-Sh 18.5 53.0 
1954-55 15.7 1(8.9 
19#-# 19.8 1(7.1 
1956-57 19.8 li7.1{ 
1957-58 18.9 1)7.5 
1958-59 16.3 1,8.1, 
1959-60 20.8 1(8.1 
1960-61 19.5 1(8.6 
1961-62 19.8 1(9.1 
1962-63 20.9 1(6.8 
1963-611 22.9 1(6.6 
1961t-65 2i|.3 1(3.7 
1965-66 27.5 1(3.2 
1966-67 29.8 1(3.2 
1967-68 33.5 13.0 
1968-69 1(1.3 k6.8 
Ratio of U.S. Corporate Io-.;a Taxable Inco% 
Profit before Tax to Before Federal Ta:< 
Corporate Profit After - Deduction 
Tax ($000,000) 
1.760 265.0 
2.160 302. h 
2.112 21(3.0 
2.128 23l(.l 
1.957 215.2 
1.892 21(2.2 
1.900 21(1.3 
1.90l( 236.1 
1.937 21(2.1 
1.928 285.3 
J .91,7 286.2 
1.965 288.8 
1.878 287.9 
1.87l( 312.9 
1.776 3k9.9 
1.762 387.6 
1.760 1(18.0 
1.753 -
1.879 560.2 
153 
"Table 6.I6. Gales and use tax classified by major group for 1950 to 
1968^ ($000) 
Tear Food • Non-durable Durable Lumber 
1950 II.L13 19,575 9,122 5,287 
1951 12,349 20,339 10,289 6,387 
1952 13,155 20,510 8,397 5,496 
1953 13,382 20,799 0,874 5,963 
1954 13.783 20,255 9,894 5,970 
1955 1/4,140 20,604 10,772 6,295 
1956 18,265 25,892 11,734 7,735 
1957 20,243 27,456 11,311 8,678 
1958 17,462 24,395 10,885 6,871 
1959 17,827 24,350 11,289 7,430 
I960 18,457 25,622 11,737 7,822 
1961 19,009 26,342 11,271 7,516 
1962 19,282 26,695 11,505 7,370 
1963 12,797 27,653 12,478 7,736 
196I1 20,187 23,067 13,579 8,031 
1965 20,870 29,108 111, 876 8,133 
1966 22,139 31,640 17,332 9,422 
1967 23,730 33,618 17,620 10,129 
1968 36,847 55,007 28,555 16,389 
Other 
11,383 
13,070 
13,3ix3 
13,lii2 
13,li05 
13,815 
18,291 
16,472 
17,575 
16,723 
18,82a 
19,197 
20,h26 
21,191 
21,737 
25,922 
28,706 
itli,7li0 
"Source; (31). 
